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1 Introduction: preferences as a development policy instrument
In recent years there have been increased pressures to help the poorest nations through
aid, debt relief and trade initiatives. At the first Ministerial Meeting of the WTO in
Singapore in 1996, the then Director-General of the WTO, Renato Ruggiero declared
his intention to press WTO members to afford tariff and quota free entry to imports
from the least-developed countries (LDCs) to the markets of the developed countries.
This initiative bore fruit in 2000, when the European Union (EU) Trade Commissioner,
Pascal Lamy, announced the intention to grant duty-free and quota-free access for all
goods (with the exception of arms) originating in least developed countries, announced
its ‘Everything But Arms’ Initiative, under which it proposed to reduce to zero all tariffs
on imports from LDCs except arms and to free such imports from any quantitative
restriction. Other developed countries have made similar proposals, including the
United States’ African Growth and Opportunities Act, but in terms of the value of trade
the EU proposal is the most important. In the current paper we attempt to evaluate the
EU proposal, using ex-ante trade simulation techniques. Section 2 gives details on
the EU scheme, Section 3 looks at the economics of unilateral preferential scheme,
Section 4 sets out the findings of our quantitative analysis and Section 5 draws some
tentative conclusions.
The notion of providing trade preferences for development purposes has its origins in
Prebisch and Singer’s work on the secular decline in the terms of trade for agricultural
commodities and the perception that only manufacturing could provide stability and
jobs in developing countries.1 The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis led to two important
policy prescriptions: sectoral intervention favouring import-competing manufacturing
industry (import-substitution industrialization), and the idea of creating non-reciprocal
tariff preferences to foster manufactured exports from the developing countries. In the
latter case, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is the most extensive and
explicit expression of an attempt to use trade preferences as a tool of development, but
today there are a number of other schemes, limited to sub-groups of developing
countries, with varying product coverage and preferential arrangements. Juridically,
preferences for LDCs form a sub-set of the GSP, while other unilateral preferences
depend on explicit waivers of WTO rules.
The GATT 1947 had no provisions for special arrangements to help developing
countries through trade (Laird et al. 2001). However, a number of provisions were
added in 1965, for example, Article XVIII, Article XXVIII bis and Part IV on Trade and
Development, which recognized the need for a ‘rapid and sustained expansion of the
export earnings’ of the developing countries and exhorting ‘positive efforts designed to
ensure that [developing countries] secure a share in the growth of international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development’ by developed countries.
Part IV also recognized the needs to ‘provide in the largest possible measure more
favourable and acceptable conditions of access to world markets’ for their limited range
of primary exports, including ‘measures to attain stable, equitable and remunerative
prices’.
                                                
1 For an early history, see ‘The History of UNCTAD 1964-84’, United Nations, New York, 1985
(Document UNCTAD/OSG/286, UN Publication Sales No. E.85.II.D.6).2
In parallel, Prebisch, then Secretary-General of UNCTAD, proposed the GSP, at
UNCTAD I in 1964. The arguments were essentially: MFN treatment did not provide
equality with domestic producers or regional trade partners unless set at zero; MFN
treatment did not take account of inequality in economic structure and levels of
development; and because negotiations were conducted on the basis of reciprocity and
the MFN principle, developing countries’ exports continued to face high tariffs.
Preferences were seen as helping to overcome these disadvantages. Prebisch’s proposals
were subsequently adopted as a principle at UNCTAD II in New Delhi in 1968. The
compromise was that the Conference agreed ‘that the objectives of the generalized, non-
reciprocal, non-discriminatory system of preferences in favour of developing countries
should be: (a) to increase their export earnings; (b) to promote their industrialization;
and (c) to accelerate their rates of economic growth’.2 It was also recognized that
‘special preferences should be granted to the less advanced developing countries’ –
LDCs in today’s terminology. It was also agreed that, while developing countries would
not offer ‘conventional reciprocity’, as a result of preferences they would be able to
import more than if the preferences had not been granted. The early discussion already
envisaged quota limits, graduation, and the eventual phasing out of preferences.
In order to allow the GSP system to become legally operational, on 25 June 1971, the
GATT Contracting Parties decided to waive the provisions of Article I of the GATT for
a period of 10 years to the extent necessary to permit contracting parties to accord
preferential tariff treatment to products originating in developing countries and
territories.3 This Decision refers to ‘generalized, non-reciprocal, non-discriminatory
preferences beneficial to the developing countries’. Finally, on 28 November 1979,
following the conclusion of the Tokyo Round in one of the ‘framework agreements’, the
Contracting Parties adopted the Decision on Differential and More Favourable
Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the ‘Enabling
Clause’) which provided a legal basis (other than a waiver) for the granting of trade
preferences, tariffs and non-tariff measures, by developed contracting parties in favour
of developing countries, and special treatment of the LDCs in the context of any general
or specific measures in favour of developing countries.4 The Enabling Clause, as a
decision of the GATT Contracting Parties, became part of the WTO system under
provisions of paragraph 1 of the GATT 1994.
The Enabling Clause therefore constitutes the legal basis by which individual WTO
Members may unilaterally grant GSP preferences to developing countries.5 Based on
the permissive rather than mandatory language of the Decision, preference givers
usually consider that they may also unilaterally modify, extend or withdraw such
preferences, including the coverage of beneficiaries. Developing countries often argue
that this creates a degree of uncertainty about the scope and duration of preferences,
                                                
2 Conference resolution 21 (II).
3 BISD 18S/24.
4 L/4903 (BISD 26S/203).
5 The granting of non-reciprocal preferences by developing countries in favour of LDCs is the subject
of the Decision of 15 June 1999 (WT/L/304).3
mitigating the benefits. Some such countries have therefore suggested the binding of
preferential rates or margins to increase the security of GSP benefits.6
The generalized basis of preferences under the Enabling Clause means that there is no
need for donor countries to seek permission to grant preferences to developing countries
or even better preferences to LDCs. However, as noted, unilateral preferences that are
only available to selected developing countries are not covered by the Enabling Clause
(cf. reciprocal preferences, under GATT Article XXIV on regional trade agreements),
and require a non-automatic ‘waiver’ from the general WTO rules. This procedure
covers preferences under the Cotonou Agreement for African, Caribbean and Pacific
(ACP) countries or the US Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), etc.
Laird et al. (2001), in an analysis of the schemes of the Quad, show that imports at GSP
rates were all less than 1 per cent of total imports by the respective donors. In Canada,
the EC and Japan, where the GSP is often a non-zero rate below the MFN rate, the
simple average GSP and LDC rates are, as might be expected, lower than the simple
average MFN rate, whether on all items or dutiable items, and the import-weighted
average on dutiable items is also lower than the import-weighted MFN average. In the
case of import-weighted averages, however, the GSP rate is higher on all items in these
three markets. This apparent inversion takes place because imports from developing
countries are often of goods that attract high MFN rates, and the import-weighting
procedure (where GSP rates are set at a margin below MFN rates) gives higher average
rates. This phenomenon cannot exist in the US, where the GSP rate is set at zero for
qualifying imports.
Statistics also demonstrate that relatively few countries have captured the main benefits
of GSP.7 Across the major schemes, there is a considerable concentration of benefits
among developing countries with relatively large and diversified economies, including
substantial manufacturing sectors. There is a strong representation of East Asian
countries and India. China is the leading beneficiary in the schemes of Canada, the EC
and Japan, but is excluded from the US scheme. Brazil is the major Latin American
beneficiary, while South Africa is the leading African beneficiary (North African
countries being covered by other preferential schemes in the EC where they might
otherwise be larger suppliers than South Africa). There are no LDCs among the top
20 GSP plus LDC suppliers to the Canadian market. Bangladesh is the only LDC in the
top 20 of such suppliers to the EC, and Mauritania is the only LDC in the top 20 of such
suppliers to Japan. Angola and Democratic Republic of the Congo are among the top 20
suppliers to the US market, with Angola being the third supplier.
It should be noted that while the WTO itself has no definition of developing countries,
the WTO accepts the definition of LDCs from the United Nations system that lists 49
LDCs on the basis of income (below US$900 per capita GDP), a human resource
criterion and an economic vulnerability criterion. In the WTO, developing countries are
often said to be a self-electing category, but in practice this depends on acceptance by
                                                
6 See for example WT/GC/W/331. The Enabling Clause does not provide legal cover for non-
reciprocal, country-selective preference schemes such as those by the EC in favour of ACP countries,
by the US and Canada in favour of Caribbean countries, and so on. These are covered by waivers from
Article I of the GATT which are limited in time and require WTO approval for renewal.
7 WTO document WT/COMTD/W/93 of 5 October 2001.4
other WTO Members, which decide whether or not to apply provisions in favour of
developing countries to a particular country.
2 EU preferential market access arrangements for LDCs
This section provides a brief overview of the preferences granted by the EU to LDCs
prior to and after the implementation of the EBA initiative.8
As mentioned, the reason for focusing on the EU is that it is the most important single
market for LDC exports. Over 50 per cent of LDC exports were sold in 2000 on the EU
market, compared to 37 per cent in 1999. In 2000, the EU took around 70 per cent of
LDC agricultural exports. Among the 49 LDCs, 15 are dependent on this market, as
over 50 per cent of their exports are directed there. The orientation of LDC exports
towards the EU market is partly explained by the relatively low tariff barriers faced in
the European market (Table 1). Out of total LDC exports, 44.7 per cent received
preferential market access and prior to the EBA implementation only 3 per cent of
existing LDC exports faced a tariff into the European Union. Out of the 49 LDCs
included the GSP scheme for LDCs 39 LDCs have also benefited from preferential
market access under the ACP regime. For non-ACP LDCs however, since 1998, the
preferential market access for LDCs in the European Union has been enhanced so as to
provide them with ACP-equivalent market access. Yet, there were still notable
differences between the two preferential regimes.9
2.1 The pre-EBA market access for LDCs
Over time, the European Union GSP scheme for LDCs has undergone a considerable
number of changes. For some products, the EU GSP scheme granted duty-free entry.
For other products, preferences for a given product were expressed as a percentage
reduction of the MFN duty rates. This percentage depended on a given product’s
‘sensitivity’, which is determined by the situation of the sector manufacturing the same
product in the Community. According to its degree of sensitivity, each product was
classified as belonging to one of four groups.10
Since 1995, the EU has eliminated all quantitative limitations. Yet, its GSP scheme
maintained the ‘graduation mechanism’ under which the benefit of the scheme is phased
out for specific sectors or countries that have reached a degree of competitiveness where
                                                
8 For a general description of the EU GSP scheme, including the EBA initiative, see for instance
UNCTAD (2002).
9 See UNCTAD (2001a:17) for further details on the products for which non-ACP LDCs were receiving
less preferential market access, compared to ACP LDCs in the pre-EBA GSP scheme for LDCs.
10 The four categories are as follows: (1) very sensitive products, for which the MFN preferential margin
is 15 per cent; (2) sensitive products, for which the MFN preferential margin is 30 per cent; (3) semi-
sensitive products, for which the MFN preferential margin is 65 per cent; (4) non-sensitive products,
which enter the European Union market duty-free.5
they increased their exports even without enjoying GSP treatment.11 Moreover, as other
preferential arrangements, the European Union GSP scheme contained safeguard
measures that could suspend or withdraw the preferential market access. Also, as
mentioned above, in 1998 the EU improved the GSP scheme for LDCs to grant them a
similar level of market access as that enjoyed by ACP countries.12
However, although the pre-EBA LDC market access to the EU had a wide coverage of
products, more than 900 agricultural products (at HS 8-digit level) were subject to ad
valorem or specific duties. Table 2 provides a selection of products with the highest
number of dutiable lines faced by LDCs exports in 2000 to the European Union, prior to
the implementation of the EBA initiative.
2.2 The EBA initiative
The EBA proposal was enacted by the Council Regulation No. 416/2001 of 28 February
2001, amending EC Regulation No. 2820/98 applying a multi-annual scheme of
generalized tariff preferences for the period 1 July 1999 to 31 December 2001, so as to
extend duty-free access without any quantitative restrictions to 919 agricultural products
originating in the least developed countries. More than 50 per cent of the liberalized
tariff lines covered meat and dairy products, beverages and milled products (Table 3).
EBA entered into force on 5 March 2001.
It should be noted that while the preferences for developing (LDC and non-LDC)
countries under the GSP scheme are subject to periodic renewal, the special
arrangements provided for in the EBA initiative (modifying the GSP) with regard to
market access for LDCs would be maintained for an unlimited period of time.13
All the products included in the initiative are agricultural products – in contrast with the
original GSP, which, in line with the Prebisch thesis, focused on manufactured products.
Products such as fruits and vegetables, meat, beverages and dairy products are now
granted duty-free and quota-free access to the EU market. Only three products have not
been liberalized immediately: bananas, rice and sugar. Their phase-in periods for full
market access are as follows:14
                                                
11 Further details on the GSP scheme of the European Union can be found in the UNCTAD Handbook
on the EU GSP Scheme, available online at http://www.unctad.org/gsp/.
12 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 602/98 of 9 March 1998 extending the coverage of Regulations
(EC) No. 3281/94 and No. 1256/96 concerning Community schemes of generalized tariff preferences
for the benefit of the least-developed countries (Official Journal L 080 1998: 1-16).
13 One common criticism of GSP schemes and other non-binding unilateral preferential schemes for
developing countries was the uncertainty of such trade regimes stemming from their annual renewal.
Donor countries can exclude countries and products or alter the procedures at any time when such
preferential schemes are reviewed. Not being subject to periodic renewal, the EBA initiative makes a
step further in reducing the uncertainty of preferential market access for LDCs. However, being
adopted within the GSP framework the EBA, unlike the EU-ACP arrangements, can be modified
unilaterally by the EU.
14 The information provided below is based on data available from the European Commission, at
http://www.europa.en.int/comm.6
•   Bananas – duties will gradually be eliminated, by a 20 per cent annual reduction,
starting on 1 January 2002. All duties will be eliminated from 1 January 2006;
•   Rice – full liberalization will be phased in between 1 September 2006 and 1
September 2009 by gradually reducing the full European Union tariff to zero. Duties
will be reduced by 20 per cent on 1 September 2006, by 50 per cent on 1 September,
2007 and by 80 per cent on 1 September, 2008. During the transition period, LDC
rice can be exported duty-free to the European Union within the limits of a tariff
quota. The initial quantities of this quota shall be based on best LDC export levels to
the European Union in the recent past, plus a growth factor of 15 per cent. The quota
will grow every year, from 2,517 tonnes (husked-rice equivalent) in 2001/2002 to
6,696 tonnes in 2008/2009 (September to August marketing year);
•   Sugar – similar arrangements are provided for sugar. Full liberalization will be
phased in between 1 July 2006 and 1 July 2009. During the transition period, LDC
raw sugar can be exported duty-free to the European Union within the limits of a
tariff quota, which will be increased from 74,185 tonnes (white-sugar equivalent) in
2001/2002 to 197,355 tons in 2008/2009. The provisions of the ACP-EC Sugar
Protocol will remain valid.
The adoption of EBA had to meet certain conditions imposed by other international
trade arrangements where the EU was signatory: the WTO agreements and the ACP
preferential trade arrangements. The EBA was adopted as an amendment to the existing
GSP scheme in order to benefit from the compatibility with the WTO rules of the
current GSP scheme. The basis for EBA under the WTO is paragraph 2(d) of the
Enabling Clause of 1979, which allows for special treatment to be granted for least
developed countries in the context of any general or specific measures in favour of
developing countries. The EBA had to be not only WTO compatible but also in line
with the ACP regime. The Lomé Convention required EU to grant non-discriminatory
market access to all ACP countries. However, the EBA initiative would have granted
more preferential market access to ACP LDCs than the one enjoyed by ACP non-LDCs.
Therefore, in the Cotonou Agreement that superseded the last Lomé Convention, article
174(2)(b) of the Lomé Convention imposing non-discrimination among ACP states was
eliminated. Thus, the European Union can offer better market access to LDC ACP
States without extending it to non-LDC ACP countries, as the above-mentioned article
would have required.
Apart from the extension of duty and quota free market access to all products (with the
exceptions of arms) originating in LDCs the EBA brings only few changes in the
general rules administering the existing GSP scheme.15 Of these, one of the more
important changes is that, unlike the EU GSP scheme that is subject to renewal and
revision, EBA has no time limitation. On the other hand, the EBA also introduces new
provisions allowing the EU to introduce safeguard measures when massive increases in
imports of products originating in the LDCs arise in relation to their usual levels of
production and export capacity. Specific safeguard measures apply especially with
regard to sensitive products (bananas, sugar and rice), if imports of these products cause
serious disruptions to the EU mechanisms regulating these products (the CAP and ACP-
                                                
15 For instance, as in the GSP scheme, the EBA also allows for diagonal cumulation of origin between
the LDCs and ASEAN, SAARC and the European Union.7
EU protocols in particular). The European Commission will review the functioning of
EBA in 2005, when amendments can be introduced, if necessary.
These new safeguard measures are in addition to those laid down in Council Regulation
No. 2820/98 of 21 December 1998, whereby preferential tariff treatment under the GSP
may be temporarily withdrawn (in whole or in part) in the case of certain activities
including slavery, forced labour,16 export of goods made by prison labour, manifest
shortcomings in customs controls on export or transit of drugs, failure to comply with
international conventions on money laundering and fraud or failure to provide the
cooperation required for the verification of certificates of origin.17 Other circumstances
qualifying for such a withdrawal are manifest cases of unfair trading practices on the
part of a beneficiary country18 or manifest infringements of the objectives of
international conventions  concerning the conservation and management of fishery
resources.
Furthermore, under Article 28 of the above mentioned regulation, MFN duties on a
product may be reintroduced where that product originating from a developing country
is imported on terms which cause or threaten to cause serious difficulties to a
Community producer of like or directly competing products. (This basically parallels
safeguards under GATT Article XIX.) In examining the possible existence of such
serious difficulties the Commission takes, among other things, the following factors into
account:  reduction in market share of Community producers, reduction in their
production, increase in their stocks, closure of their production capacity, bankruptcies,
low profitability, low rate of capacity utilization, employment, trade and prices.19
The EBA initiative modifies the GSP scheme by adding to the reasons for the possible
temporary withdrawal of preferences a ‘massive increases in imports into the
Community of products originating in LDCs in relation to their usual levels of
production and export capacity’.20 This addition shall allow the Commission to ‘react
swiftly when the Communities financial interests are at stake’.21 The post-EBA GSP
scheme also contains an extra paragraph in article 28 allowing for the suspension of the
preferences provided by this regulation for rice, sugar and bananas, ‘if imports of these
products cause serious disturbance to the Community markets and their regulatory
mechanisms’.22 The Commission announced that whenever LDC imports of rice, sugar
or bananas exceed, or are likely to exceed the previous years level by more than 25 per
                                                
16 A temporary withdrawal on this ground has been exercised in 1997, when Myanmar has been
temporarily excluded from GSP treatment for alleged forced labour practices. Council Regulation
552/97 of 24 March 1997. OJ L 85, 27 March 1997.
17 Article 22:1 (a)-(d) of the Council Regulation No. 2820/98 of 21 December 1998.
18 Article 22:1 (e) of the Regulation states that the withdrawal shall be in full compliance with the WTO
rules.
19 Article 28:3 states that the Commission will do so ‘where the information is available’.
20 Article 1:4 of Council Regulation No. 416/2001 of 28 February 2001.
21 Paragraph 13 in the preamble of Council Regulation No. 416/2001 of 28 February 2001.
22 Article 1:5 of Council Regulation No. 416/2001 of 28 February 2001.8
cent, then it will automatically examine whether the conditions for applying GSP
safeguard measures are met.23
It remains to be seen whether the EBA modifications to the GSP safeguard scheme will
in practice work to frustrate market access for LDCs or to provide a genuine escape
mechanism where severe market disturbances result from the newly granted LDC
preferences.
3 The economics of non-reciprocal trading arrangements
The larger part of current preferential trade is associated with the existence of regional
agreements, under GATT Article XXIV, whereby countries reciprocate mutual trade
concessions. The EBA initiative is an example of a non-reciprocal, preferential trade
arrangement, falling within the framework of the WTO’s Enabling Clause. Under these
arrangements, ‘beneficiary’ or preference-receiving countries do not have the obligation
to reciprocate to ‘donor’ or preference-granting countries. What distinguishes the EBA
from other unilateral preference schemes (excluding GSP) is a lower degree of
discrimination. Although GSP is supposed to be ‘generalized’ and ‘non-discriminatory’,
in practices GSP arrangements often provide, for each sector, differential treatment of
beneficiary countries. By contrast, under EBA all LDCs are to be equally given duty-
free, quota-free access to the market of the EU donor countries in all sectors but arms.24
What are the effects of preferential trade arrangements? Does it matter if those
arrangements are non-reciprocal? Which kind of information do we need to assess the
impact of non-reciprocal, preferential trade arrangements on donor, recipient and third
countries? The theory of international trade helps answering such questions.
The easiest way to figure out the effects of preferential trade arrangements is to refer to
a partial equilibrium three-country, one-product framework.25 Countries are denoted by
A, B and C. Countries A and B are assumed to be signing a non-reciprocal, preferential
trade arrangement in which A is the donor and B is the beneficiary country. Country C
represents the rest of the world. Production occurs in perfectly competitive firms, and
returns to scale are non-increasing. Under standard conditions on preferences and
technologies, the import demand curve for country A, MA, will be downward sloping
(see Figure 1). Country A can import the good either from country B or from the rest of
the world C. In absence of any preferential trade arrangement, country A levies an
import duty equal to t on the imports originating from both B and C. We also assume
that the export supply curve to A is perfectly horizontal for C (XC in Figure 1) and
positively sloped for B (XB). This is normally the case when B is a relatively small
economy with respect to C, representing the rest of the world.
                                                
23 Statement of the European Commission of 1 March 2001. See also the reports available at
http://w.sugartraders.co.uk/archive.htm and http://www.eurinco.co.uk/trade/eba_rev2.htm.
24 This is not the case of the US scheme which provides duty-free and quota-free treatment for African
countries, some of which are not LDCs, while excluding non-African countries.
25 This analytical approach has been introduced by Viner (1950). In the exposition, we follow quite
closely Panagariya (1998).9
Let us then consider the effects associated with A giving preferential duty-free access to
B. Initially, the import price in A is equal to Pc + t, total imports amount to OQ  0, of
which 
0
B Q  come from country B, and the rest from C (Figure 1). After granting duty-
free access to PTA, country A removes its tariff only on the imports originating from B.
The situation in the beneficiary country B is evident from Figure 2. Before
liberalization, the domestic price in country A is equal to Pc + t and exporters earn  C P
for each unit sold in A. Since country B is an exporter of the good in the pre-
liberalization scenario, at price  C P  supply must exceed demand in B. Moreover, being
an exporter, country B will not have any tariff on the good. After granting duty-free
access to B, A starts importing duty-free from B, so that the exporters of B get the full
domestic price  t P C +  for each unit sold in A. This price change has major effects in B:
all production in B will be directed towards A. Producers in B are in fact bound to serve
the domestic market at price  C P , otherwise domestic buyers would shift to imports from
C. Necessarily, after receiving duty-free access, producers in B will only sell to A at
t P C + , and consumers in B will only import the good from C.
It is now straightforward to look at the effects of the preferential liberalization on the
donor country A. Because of the quite extreme assumption that the supply of the rest of
the world C is perfectly horizontal, there would be no change in the import price in A
after liberalization and no change in imported quantities. Necessarily, trade creation
would be absent. There will be instead a shift of imports away from the rest of the world
C and in favour of the beneficiary country B. However, it may be noted that the shift in
the supply curve of B producers to the A market does not correspond to a shift from the
original export supply curve 
t
B X  to the ‘duty-free curve’  B X . Since all production from
B will now be sold to A, with no sales on the domestic market of B, the supply curve of
B to A will correspond to the same supply curve  B S  as in Figure 2. The new import
level of A from B will thus be 
1
B Q .
As for welfare, trade creation is straightforwardly nil, thus no gains accrue to country A
from this source. Moreover, since B at the new price is less efficient than C in producing
the required imports, trade diversion would result. The shift towards less efficient
suppliers will entail a loss in tariff revenue for A, represented by area ACFI. So, the
donor country loses due to a trade-diversion effect. As for B, there is an improvement in
the terms of trade. This results in export expansion for B, larger output volume, and
increased producer rents, which rise by an amount represented by trapezoid ACGI.
Finally, the effects on the rest of the world are nil, since C has a flat export supply
curve. On net, the preferential liberalization policy of A leads to a net loss for the world
as a whole, represented by the triangle CFG in Figure 1. This corresponds to the loss in
tariff revenue in A less the increase in producer surplus in B. The deadweight loss is
associated with the higher cost of production of quantity 
1 ˆ
B BQ Q  in B as compared with
C. A more efficient producer has been replaced by a less efficient one.26
                                                
26 Note that there is not such an inefficiency associated with imports 
1 0
B BQ Q  because these quantities are
not produced additionally after PTA: they are just redirected from the domestic market of B to the
market of A.10
Summarizing, from the standard 3x1 partial equilibrium model it emerges that granting
non-reciprocal preferences is more likely to generate gains in the beneficiary country,
losses in the donor country, to have negligible effects on third countries and to produce
a deadweight loss on aggregate. It is to note that the major welfare effects of preferential
liberalization are associated with easily identifiable and measurable trade flows. In
particular, the gains to the beneficiary country are associated with its export expansion,
while the losses in the donor country are associated with the amount of third country
imports displaced.
However, there are some major caveats concerning the foregoing analysis. First, the
result that trade creation is nil for the donor country after granting preferential market
access depends crucially on the assumption that the supply curve for the rest of the
world is perfectly flat. Allowing for a less-than-perfectly flat supply curve would result
in positive trade creation and improved global welfare as long as the supply curve of the
beneficiary country is flatter than that of the rest of the world.
Second, a single homogenous good has been assumed, and this justifies the assumption
of the supply curve of the rest of the world being perfectly flat. When goods originating
from different countries are imperfect substitutes, the a-priori concerning the relative
elasticity of the supply curve of goods originating from different countries becomes less
obvious. It can be shown that with imperfectly substitute goods and perfectly elastic
supply curves for both beneficiary and third countries a policy of preferential, non-
reciprocal liberalization may either increase or lower world welfare (see, for example,
UNCTAD 2002) for a survey of the theoretical literature on the topic).
Third, general equilibrium effects are neglected in the above analysis. No assessment is
made on whether the conclusion of non-reciprocal trade arrangements is likely to
improve or worsen the allocation of resources within countries. Depending on the sector
bias of the trade arrangement, the patterns of trade may become either closer or depart
from countries’ comparative advantages. These issues are relevant for assessing the
effects on world welfare, but their analysis require a full-fledged multi-sectoral general
equilibrium setting.
In the next section, we simulate the granting of unilateral preferences by the EU for
LDCs. We also move from the classical analysis described above in several ways. On
the one hand, we consider non-infinite supply conditions, non-homogeneous goods (the
‘Armington’ assumption) and, in part of the analysis, we also move to a general
equilibrium framework.
4 Assessing the impact of EBA
Existing studies based on simulation analysis (Ianchovichina et al. 2001, UNCTAD
2001b, Trueblood and Somwaru 2002) show that the impact of the EBA initiative is
likely to be concentrated on a narrow set of sectors, in particular, sugar and rice. From
these studies, it also emerges that, while for some beneficiary LDC countries the effect
of the liberalization policy may be non-negligible (at the end of the transition period),
the effects on the EU are likely to be minor. However, trade diversion will take place
especially for the non-LDC developing countries receiving preferences from the EU but
excluded from EBA.11
The aim of this section is, first, that of assessing the aggregate worldwide distribution of
gains and losses of the EBA initiative, focussing on the LDCs and on third non-
beneficiary developing countries, using a computable general equilibrium simulation
model (GTAP). Second, the disaggregated sectoral dimension is explored by means of
partial equilibrium simulations (based on the SMART model). In this case, the focus of
the analysis is that of understanding in which product categories the expansion and
redirection of trade flows will be stronger.
4.1 The aggregate impact
4.1.1 The experiment, the model and the data
Our objective is that of simulating the effects of a complete removal of both tariff and
non-tariff barriers faced by LDCs in the EU market. We look at the effects of the policy
on each country’s welfare, and on their sectoral trade and production patterns. Welfare
changes are further decomposed in their allocative effects and the terms of trade
component. Our policy experiment is similar to those found in Ianchovichina et al.
(2001), UNCTAD (2001a) and Trueblood and Somwaru (2002). However, there are
some important differences that are discussed below.
The model used for the CGE simulations in the present study is that developed under
the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) as described in Hertel (1997). GTAP is a
widely used ex-ante evaluation tool for trade policy analysis. Since the EBA initiative is
likely to impact mainly the agricultural sector, the standard static, perfect competition,
constant returns to scale version of GTAP is adopted.27
The database used in the simulations is that available in GTAP Database Release No. 5
(GTAP5), with a 1997 base year. This is therefore the benchmark (status-quo) in
evaluating the impact of trade policy shocks.28
                                                
27 For a description of the GTAP model see Hertel (1997). The world is divided in regions. Within each
region, consumers have the same non-homothetic preferences, according to which allocate income
between private consumption, public consumption and savings. Products originating from different
countries are perceived as different by consumers (Armington differentiation). The elasticity of
substitution between any pair of domestic and imported goods is constant within each sector, and the
elasticity of substitution between each pair of imported goods originating from different countries is
twice higher than that between domestic and foreign goods. The production side of the model assumes
fixed production coefficients between primary inputs and intermediate inputs. As for intermediate
inputs, they are also assumed to be ‘Armington differentiated’, with constant substitution elasticities.
Production factors are fully employed. Labour is mobile across sectors and immobile internationally.
Households’ savings finance investment, and investment does not affect the current capital stock.
Countries can borrow and lend abroad. The ‘standard’ GTAP closure is adopted: total world savings
add up to total world investment and expected rates of returns on savings are equalized across world
regions. The trade balance of different regions is thus determined endogenously, and reacts to trade
policy shocks.
28 Note that analogous studies on EBA using GTAP have used different versions of the GTAP database.
While UNCTAD (2001b) uses the pre-release 3 of the GTAP5 database, Trueblood and Somwaru
(2002) use version 5.0.1. Further details on GTAP databases are found on the GTAP website:
http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap.12
The 66 GTAP country definitions are aggregated into 18 regional groups. LDCs are
disaggregated into Bangladesh, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and
rest of sub-Saharan Africa (see Annex 1). Because of constraints in the available
country aggregation from the GTAP5 database, in this scheme not all LDC countries
benefit from non-reciprocal liberalization. In particular, Pacific and Caribbean LDCs are
not included among the beneficiary countries. The same holds for the Asian LDCs other
than Bangladesh (for example, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Cambodia, Myanmar) and some
African LDCs (Angola, Lesotho). Conversely, some countries in rest of sub-Saharan
Africa that are not LDCs (Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria,
Seychelles) end up being beneficiaries in the used aggregations. For this reason (and
others related to the assumptions of the model) the results should be seen as indicative
of the order of magnitude of the effects of the EBA initiative.
The original 57 sectors available in GTAP5 have been aggregated into 21 new sectors
(see Annex 1). Services and several manufactures are quite aggregated in the used
sectoral classification, whereas goods intensively exported by LDCs (agricultural
products, food, basic commodities and light manufacturing) are kept disaggregated.
The protection data contained in GTAP include applied MFN tariffs and the ad valorem
equivalents for non-tariff protection in agriculture and in textiles and clothing.29 For
agriculture, the protective power of specific duties and compound duties and tariff-
quotas is translated into ad valorem equivalents. In the case of tariff-quotas, the ad
valorem equivalent reported in the GTAP database is an average of the within-quota and
the out-of-quota rates.30
Since LDCs benefited from existing non-reciprocal preferential trading arrangements
also before the implementation of EBA (associated, for instance, with the GSP or the
Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP countries), we have had to
reconstruct this information in the GTAP modelling system (more later) and database
that we use for the experiment. In particular, we have modified the basic protection data
available in GTAP5 to take into account the pre-EBA preference margins available to
LDCs in the EU market, using data from the UNCTAD TRAINS database. Applied
MFN and preferential tariff data have been aggregated into the sectors we have defined
for the simulations using world trade weights constructed from the UN COMTRADE
database.31 The ratio between preferential and MFN tariffs so obtained was then used to
compute LDC preference margins granted by the EU in each sector. These margins have
then been used to update the protection data of the GTAP5 database. The EU protection
data employed in the simulations are reported in Table 4.
                                                
29 Non-tariff protection in textiles and apparel takes often the form of voluntary export restraints
administered by exporters under the Multi-Fibre-Agreement. In GTAP, this is modelled as a vector of
ad-valorem export taxes.
30 A detailed description of the agricultural protection data in GTAP is available in Gibson, Wainio, and
Whitley, Ch. 16.C of the Documentation on GTAP4 available at the website
http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap.
31 Only the lowest preferential tariffs available to LDCs has been selected to compute preference
margins. Weights have been constructed using world trade flows instead of bilateral flows to avoid
underestimation of preferential tariffs.13
Several points are worth noting about the sectoral data. First, the EU MFN protection is
concentrated in agriculture and food (with particularly high rates – between 50 and 200
per cent – in rice, sugar, cereals, dairy products and meat). Textiles and clothing receive
also considerable MFN protection, with rates around 10 per cent. Second, prior to the
EBA, imports of textiles and in manufacturing from LDCs enjoyed duty-free treatment,
while in agriculture and food preference margins in favour of LDCs varied considerably
across product categories. In dairy and meat products, vegetables and fruits, vegetable
oils and fats and other food products preference margins are quite high, well above 50
per cent. Conversely, preference margins are very tight in rice, sugar and cereals.
While our policy experiment is similar to that of other studies mentioned earlier, the
results cannot be fully compared across these studies for several reasons. First, the
beneficiary countries of the EBA initiative are all LDCs, whereas in Ianchovichina et al.
(2001) preferential market access is targeted to sub-Saharan African countries only.
Second, the versions of the GTAP database used in the different studies differ (GTAP4
in Ianchovichina et al. 2001, GTAP5 pre-release 3 in UNCTAD 2001a, GTAP5.0.1 in
Trueblood and Somwaru 2002, and a modified version of GTAP5 in the present study)
and the aggregation chosen by individually for countries and sectors from what is
available in GTAP is not the same. Finally, the criteria followed to include pre-EBA
preferences for LDCs in the database differ between Ianchovichina et al. (2001),
UNCTAD (2001a) and the present study, whereas in Trueblood and Somwaru (2002) no
account is given for the pre-EBA preference regime.
4.1.2 Simulation results
As one might expect, all beneficiary countries gain from the EBA initiative in welfare
terms, while the donor (the EU) loses slightly from the initiative (Table 5). In theory,
third countries may either lose or gain, depending on whether the degree of substitution
between the exports from these countries and those of the beneficiaries.32 Results show
in fact that some world regions stand to lose, while others gain. In the aggregate, the
world the net gains from the EBA initiative are positive.
In absolute terms (equivalent variation in US$m) the biggest gain accrues to rest of sub-
Saharan Africa, while the greatest loss occurs for the EU. Uganda and Bangladesh are
the beneficiary countries whose gains are estimated to be the lowest. Among third
countries, those that reap positive gains are the Rest of Developed countries (mainly
Oceania and EFTA countries), Transition Economies and the Middle East. Conversely,
NAFTA and Asian countries are those that suffer the biggest losses.
Overall, the policy shock points to an improvement in allocative efficiency, and this
explains the gain at the worldwide level. Allocative gains are especially evident for
LDCs. A shift towards agricultural goods and food production (which face the highest
pre-EBA levels of protection in the EU) induces a better exploitation of comparative
advantages in these countries. On the other hand, the EU loses in terms of efficiency,
                                                
32 The degree of substitution/complementarity of beneficiaries countries’ and third countries’ exports
determines the sign and the extent of the terms of trade effects. Third countries can benefit from terms
of trade effects provided that a complementarity relation prevails. See, for example, Bora et al. (2002)
for a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on preferential, non-reciprocal trade
arrangements.14
which may be interpreted as a typical consequence of trade diversion: the preferential
liberalization targeted to LDCs displaces more efficient imports originating from third
countries. However, the bulk of welfare changes for individual countries are associated
with terms of trade effects. Not surprisingly, all beneficiary countries benefit from
increased prices for their exports to the EU market and this causes an improvement in
their terms of trade. Conversely, the terms of trade of the EU fall as a result of higher
import prices from LDCs. As far as third countries are concerned, Japan and NAFTA
countries incur a particularly strong negative terms of trade effect, while Middle East
and China receive a considerable gain associated with an improvement in the terms of
trade. In general, the welfare changes due to terms of trade effects are quite small for
third countries. This is due to the fact that the world share of LDCs exports is too small
for EBA to cause a significant negative twist in the terms of trade of competing
exporters (see also Table 6).
As for aggregate export changes (Table 6), an increase is observed for all beneficiary
countries (except Mozambique). Less intuitively, exports rise also for the EU. In the
case of LDCs, after EBA resources are shifted away into the sectors which received the
highest pre-EBA protection in the EU. Most of this factor flow occurs between import-
competing industries and the sectors benefited from EBA. This explains the rise in
aggregate exports from almost all beneficiary countries. To some extent, however, a
process of resource allocation occurs also between alternative export sectors. In
particular, some export industries for LDCs that do not benefit from EBA may contract.
This is particularly the case for textiles and clothing from Bangladesh and services from
Mozambique (see Table 8). This also explains why the exports from Bangladesh remain
almost unchanged and those of Mozambique even fall on aggregate. As for the EU, the
export increase is associated with resources shifting away from agriculture into export-
oriented industries.
As for the sectoral effects of EBA, Tables 7 and 8 report, respectively, the percentage
and value changes in exports by exporting country and industry. Looking at percentage
changes the sectors in which it is concentrated the export increase of beneficiary
countries are paddy rice, sugarcane, sugar and processed rice. In sub-Saharan African
LDCs, sugar exports may even become ten times higher after EBA. In general, we also
see that cereals and diary products become increasingly exported by beneficiary
countries. The rise in vegetable and fruit exports is substantial only for Zambia,
Bangladesh and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, while that in meat and meat products is
concentrated in Uganda and rest of sub-Saharan Africa.
In value terms, looking at the aggregate exports of LDCs (Table 8), the increase
associated with EBA is very concentrated in sugar and sugarcane, which account by
themselves for almost all the change in values. Bangladesh, seems to be the main
exception, with its exports increasing mostly in other food and processed rice. The rest
of sub-Saharan Africa has the most diversified change in exports, with relevant
increases in sugar, processed rice, other food and vegetables and fruits.
Overall, results indicate that the EBA policy has a positive impact of LDCs exports and
welfare, coupled with losses for the EU and third countries of a smaller magnitude.
LDCs exports appear to increase by almost US$300m per year, nearly half a percentage
point from the baseline value. Compared with those found in other studies, our
simulations show smaller export and welfare gains for beneficiary countries. This is due
to the fact that the database used is referred to a more recent benchmark (this is a15
difference with respect to Ianchovichina et al. 2001, and UNCTAD 2001a) and because
pre-EBA LDC preferences in the EU market are taken into account (a major point of
departure from Trueblood and Somwaru 2002). As found in previous studies, the impact
of EBA appears to be very concentrated in few sectors, in particular sugar and rice.
It is important to stress that results from CGE simulations are subject to some major
caveats. First, the analysis neglects important aspects of trade reform related to
technology transfer, learning by doing and knowledge accumulation. In this respect, the
model probably underestimates the impact of EBA on beneficiary countries. Moreover,
the analysis refers to a long-run scenario, and adjustment issues are neglected. This
maybe a serious limitation especially when analysing the economies of LDCs, normally
characterized by structural rigidities. This may lead to a possible exaggeration of the
effects of trade reforms. Finally, the model neglects institutional aspects that affect
crucially the impact of preferential market access. Due to stringent rules of origin
administrative procedures, some LDCs may not be able to take full advantage from the
EBA policy. Simulations have instead been performed under the assumption that a good
exported from a given country can always benefit from preferential treatment in
destination countries, irrespective of the share of value added originating in the
exporting country. Neglecting the role of rules of origin leads to an overestimation of
the effects of the liberalization initiatives considered.
4.2 The Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative: is it really everything but (f)arms?
Two major concerns were voiced during the adoption of EBA by the EU. The first
related to the significant trade diversion effects that the EBA could potentially have on
other developing countries, ACP countries in particular (Page and Hewitt 2002). The
second warned against the impact of EBA on the European Union’s Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and argued that, because of likely exclusions to avoid
damage to EU agriculture, the EBA would in fact be ‘everything but farms’ (Rasmussen
2001). The CAP has provided an array of policy measures in support of domestic
agricultural production and EU farmers’ incomes.33 Domestically, the CAP introduced
various direct and indirect support measures, while on the foreign trade side, it is now
based on complex and substantial tariffs and tariff quotas to reduce import competition
attracted by high domestic prices, while export subsidies are used to dispose of domestic
production surpluses.34
In the past, several budgetary crises arose for certain products (grains, milk and sugar)
as the CAP budget was too small to ensure attractive running (Weyerbrock, 1998).
Budgetary problems also became an issue during the adoption of EBA. It was argued by
many domestic producer groups that EBA, by eliminating tariffs and tariff quotas on
products that are subject to CAP provisions, would increase imports to such an extent
that it would make CAP support measures ineffective (Agra Europe 2001). Despite
                                                
33 The CAP comprises a series of general and sectoral arrangements for almost all agricultural products:
arable crops, potato starch, cereals, olive oil, grain legumes, flax, hemp, silk worms, bananas, dried
grapes, tobacco, seeds, hops, rice, meat and meat products, milk and milk products, wine, etc.
34 Quantitative restrictions and variable import levies were eliminated under the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture, although some product re-classification closely mirrors the effects of
variable levies.16
these concerns, several factors suggest that the impact of EBA on European agriculture
and the CAP budget will be, if not minimal, at least manageable. An impact study
conducted by the European Commission on the effects of EBA on several agricultural
markets shows that, depending upon the preliminary assumptions used, the extra-
budgetary costs are between 1.5 and 2.6 billion Euro (EC 2000a). This would represent
an increase by approximately 3 to 7 per cent of the 1999 CAP budget.
As the CGE analysis undertaken in the previous section has pointed out, both concerns
seem to be exaggerated. In aggregate, the CGE results confirms expectations that the
impact of the EBA will be concentrated in few sectors, sugar and rice in particular.
However, the CGE results were qualified by a number of caveats that affect the results
in both directions: over- and under-estimation of the EBA effects. Consequently, the
current section seeks to expand the results obtained in the previous section and to
address some of these caveats. The subsequent analysis will use a partial equilibrium
framework to investigate the impact of the EBA at the most disaggregated level both in
terms of products and countries, with a special focus on the three sensitive products
included in the EBA: rice, sugar, and bananas.
4.2.1 The model, data, and scenarios
The model used to estimate the various effects of the EBA initiative is the SMART
model. SMART is a simple ex ante partial equilibrium model, measuring the first-round
impact of trade policy changes.35 Unlike the general equilibrium analyses, the model
does not account for economy-wide effects of trade liberalization or inter-industry
effects. However, the advantage of partial equilibrium models is the very detailed level
of analysis. Working at this disaggregated level the SMART model allows considerable
precision in identifying sensitive products and countries affected by the EBA.
The most important effects estimated by the model are the trade creation and diversion
effects.  Trade creation effects capture the increase in imports by donor countries
(exports by beneficiaries) resulting from the tariff cut and the corresponding decrease in
domestic prices (which are assumed fully reflect the tariff changes). Trade diversion
measures the extent to which imports from preference-receiving countries will substitute
current imports from third countries. Imports from alternative foreign suppliers are
assumed to be imperfect substitutes and export supply elasticities are not assumed to be
infinite (although this is a default value in the modelling system, as described below).
To estimate the trade creation and trade diversion effects, the model uses a number of
variables from different databases. For preferential market access liberalization (as in
the case of EBA) the model uses applied tariff data for each trade regime applicable to
different trade partners (applied MFN, GSP, GSP-LDC, ACP, free trade areas) in the
given market. Tariff data include both ad valorem and specific rates. For specific rates,
ad valorem equivalents are calculated for each of the EU trade regimes. These data are
available from UNCTAD-TRAINS database, available online at www.unctad-
trains.org.36 In the model, the base rate is applied at the tariff-line level against
                                                
35 For a technical description of the model, methodology, data and uses see Laird and Yeats (1990).
36 UNCTAD-TRAINS (TRade Analysis and INformation System) is a comprehensive computerized
information system at the HS-based tariff line level covering tariff, para-tariff and non-tariff measures
as well as import flows by origin for more than 100 countries.17
individual partner countries. Bilateral import flows are available from UNCTAD-
TRAINS database. The rate of utilization of preferences, used in one of the simulation
scenarios, comes from UNCTAD GSP database.37
The SMART model uses information on elasticities of import demand, export supply
and substitution (between foreign suppliers – ‘Armington’ elasticities). Elasticities on
import demand are gathered from a literature search, of which the primary source was
Stern et al. (1975) and the data has been subsequently updated with other more recent
information.
The scenarios included testing the impact of the EBA under different assumptions,
taking into account the importance of LDC trade re-orientation, as suggested by other
studies.38 It is assumed that all LDCs benefit from duty-free and quota-free market
access, without taking into account other trade regulations that might impede their
market access in the EU.
Scenario 1: no LDC trade re-orientation
Our first scenario of the EBA effects on LDCs, the EU and third countries assumes that
LDCs are able to export all their products covered by the EBA with duty- and quota-
free market access. This scenario also assumes that the improved market access in the
EU will have no impact on trade flows between LDCs and third countries.
Scenario 2: LDC trade-reorientation
A shortcoming of most modelling approaches is their path-dependent logic. In particular
these methodologies imply that the absence of trade flows between two partners in the
base period, for example, because of the presence of a non-tariff measure or
prohibitively high tariff, means that there will be no trade either in the estimated period.
In the case of fairly aggregated CGE analyses, the likelihood of zero trade flows is low.
However, in a very disaggregated analysis as the current one, for a significant number
of products there are no current exports from certain LDCs to the EU. In such cases,
despite the EBA initiative, the simulation results will show no improvement in the
export performance of LDCs in these products.
One approach, which seems reasonable for looking at the EBA, is to circumvent this
limitation by running a simulation using LDC exports to world markets rather than to
the EU alone. The reasoning behind this simulation is that certain LDCs may face
restrictions on their current access to the EU, but, under the EBA initiative, would be
able to divert some of their existing exports from lower-priced markets to the EU to take
advantage of the preferential margin introduced by the EBA and the substantial price
differential between EU domestic and world prices (Table 9). An important example is
sugar, where EU prices are 160 per cent higher than world prices. This sector will be
looked at in greater detail in section 4.2.3.
                                                
37 For various reasons, including notably rules of origin and documentation requirements, all imports
from a beneficiary do not necessarily enter at duty-free rates.
38 For a study that also takes into account the LDC utilization rates, rules of origin and other trade
regulations contained in GSP schemes, see UNCTAD (2001b). On the possible re-orientation of LDC
exports as a result of the EBA, see EC (2000a, b).18
Therefore, Scenario 2 assumes that LDC exports to the world of products liberalized by
the EBA will actually be re-oriented towards the EU, in order to take advantage of
preferences and price wedges between EU domestic prices and world market prices.
This will give an indication of the maximum trade effects to be expected from EBA on
the short and medium term, without taking into account shifting of domestic production
to exports or increases in total production capacity as a result of new investments. For
sensitive products under a transition period of duty-free tariff rate quotas (sugar, rice,
and bananas), this scenario estimates the impact of the EBA at the end of the transition
periods.
For this scenario, since the latest data on LDC exports are not available for all LDCs,
LDC world exports are approximated by ‘mirror data’, that is, world imports from
LDCs. These data are available at the 6-digit HS level in the COMTRADE database. To
ensure the comparability of results with the alternative scenario, trade data had to be
further disaggregated at national tariff line level (10-digit in the case of the EU). In the
absence of the relevant information, the procedure used was to assume that trade at 6-
digit level is evenly distributed across national tariff lines within each 6-digit item.
4.2.2 Results (Figures 3–15 and Tables 10, 11 and 15)
Although the EBA extends duty- and quota-free market access for LDCs in more than
900 tariff lines, the SMART estimates from Scenario 1 suggest that, based on current
exports, LDC will be able to take advantage of this enhanced market access for only 124
products at tariff line level. Under more optimistic assumptions that LDCs will be able
to shift existing exports from third countries to the EU market (Scenario 2), the number
of products (at tariff line level) that are likely to benefit from the EBA rises to 622. The
expected increase in sugar exports is by far the most important to emerge at the end of
the transition period. The results from Scenario 1 (Figure 3) suggest quite clearly that
EBA rather than being ‘everything but arms’ could be better labelled ‘nothing but
sugar’.
Our estimates also show that only a handful of LDCs would see total trade at tariff line
level increased by more than US$100,000, which is a combination of trade creation and
the trade diversion effects, positive or negative, as the case may be (Figure 4). Malawi,
the biggest winner, stands to increase its cane sugar exports by more than US$ 25
million. Other African LDCs (Madagascar, Tanzania, Zambia) are likely to see their
cane sugar exports increase by between US$5 and 10 million. The only Asian LDC that
shows exports increases at tariff line level by more than US$100,000 is Myanmar. The
SMART estimates also suggest that Sudan is likely to see significant increases in its
exports of molasses (product code 1703) and cereals (grain sorghum, product code
1007).
Unsurprisingly, the largest losers from negative trade diversion, in absolute values, are
the current major ACP sugar exporters (Mauritius, Aruba, Fiji, Guyana). There is also a
relatively large loss from trade diversion for the United States in grain sorghum
(product code 1007009) (Figure 5). However, two of the sensitive sectors identified by
the EU (rice and bananas) do not seem to face particularly large trade effects, compared
to sugar (Figures 6–8).
The SMART estimates suggest that, in the case rice exports, apart from modest export
increases in certain rice products for Madagascar, Lao PDR, and Mozambique, other19
LDCs will not have any likely improvements in their market shares in the EU. This
moderate increase in rice exports from LDCs seems to come at the expense of current
rice exports from Thailand and United States (Figure 7). A similar analysis for bananas
suggests that the largest total trade effect is likely to occur for Rwanda (US$147,000),
while the reductions in current exports through trade diversion would be fairly evenly
distributed between Latin and Central American producers (Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Colombia, and Panama) (Figure 8).
Once the possibility of reorientation of LDC exports from third markets to the EU is
taken into account (Scenario 2), the EBA shows a more diverse potential impact of the
patterns of LDC exports to the EU. Apart from sugar and molasses – which remain key
– live sheep, sheep meat, powder milk and cream, bananas, maize, broken rice, grain
sorghum, wheat flour, and rum and tafia are other products in which relatively high
export changes can occur. Two other important products for LDCs, apart from sugar,
are wheat bran (product code 230230100) and broken rice (1006400010). Tables 10 and
11 provide a breakdown by LDCs of the trade creation and diversion effects, ordered by
the size of their initial imports. In the case of wheat bran, Congo, Dem. Rep. and
Tanzania appear to benefit the most from the EBA provisions. For broken rice, Togo
and Niger seem able to almost double their current exports, should a trade reorientation
occur and EBA provisions permit such a steep increase in imports of rice from LDCs.
In terms of beneficiary countries, Sudan emerges as the largest winner with a relatively
large variety of products (sugar, cereals, live animals), followed by Malawi and
Mozambique, which remain largely dependent on their increases in sugar exports.
Overall, however, the number of beneficiary countries that manage to increase their
exports substantially at tariff line level increases significantly. Fourteen LDCs are able
to reap overall positive trade effect bigger than US$500,000. Sudan, Tanzania and Niger
have relatively more diversified trade effects, while Nepal and Congo, Dem. Rep. are
likely to benefit from significant trade effects in only one tariff line. Somehow
surprising is the modest presence of Asian LDCs among the major beneficiaries of the
EBA. Previous studies have identified Asian LDCs as those that enjoy less favourable
market access than ACP LDCs and, by this token, EBA should have brought theme
relatively more gains. However, the only Asian LDC that seems to benefit substantially
from EBA is Myanmar.
Also, under Scenario 2, the list of negatively affected countries also becomes more
diverse than under Scenario 1. Apart from ACP countries negatively affected in their
sugar exports, other preference-receiving countries (for example, Hungary, Romania
and Poland) appear as net losers from trade diversion, particularly in live animals.
However, if one takes into account the indirect protection on vegetables, fruits, meat
and diary products as well as other food products introduced by complex sanitary and
phytosanitary measures – by many LDC standards – that their exports must meet before
entering the EU, the increase in LDC exports for processed agri-food products may well
turn out to be smaller than our estimates.39
                                                
39 See for instance the case of shrimps exports from Bangladesh provided in UNCTAD (2001a: 108-
109).20
4.2.3 Sensitive products: the special case of sugar
As the results of both CGE and partial equilibrium analysis have showed, it is quite
unrealistic to expect EBA to have a major impact on the volume of imports into the EU
market, at least on the short term. However, since certain impact studies including EU
(2000a, 2000b) have predicted, the scale of LDC export growth based on a reorientation
of their world export towards the EU, some EU producers and non-LDC developing
countries (in particular non-LDC ACP countries) have been alarmed by the potential
effects of EBA. It is thought that the impact of EBA could be significant for
competitors, particularly if LDCs exports were concentrated in products of particular
sensitivity or in intricately regulated EU markets. This may be the case with sugar.
Indeed, the greatest concern about EBA has been expressed so far by EU sugar
producers and the main ACP sugar exporters.40 Both are concerned that LDC exports
may displace their own production, but the fears of the ACP seem much more soundly
based. In order to assess the real magnitude of these concerns, this section provides
some additional insights on the issue, including the mechanisms regulating the EU sugar
regime.41
Firstly, it focuses on the way the EU market for sugar is functioning in terms of
domestic production, exports and imports. As the EBA sugar adds a further element to
an already complex system, in the transitional period (2001-2009) it is expected to
activate some internal adjustments that could affect the other components. Secondly, it
gives a closer looks at the results of the simulation for LDC sugar following the
transitional period, that is, after 2009. These findings, together with the current patterns
of LDCs sugar exports should provide some additional understanding of the existing
evidence.
The EBA and the EU market for sugar
The EU market for sugar is perhaps one of the most outstanding examples of extensive
market regulations and state intervention aimed at ensuring high and stable prices for
sugar producers and refineries. The main elements of the Common Market Organization
of Sugar (CMOS) relevant for our purposes are:
– Domestic production quotas (divided in sugar quotas A, B and ‘sugar C’);
– The intervention price acting as a minimum guarantee price (through Paying and
Intervention Agencies);42
– Export refunds or subsidies;
– Import duties and preferential imports.
                                                
40 See for instance the impact study carried out by the Sugar Traders Association of the United
Kingdom, available online at http://www.sugartraders.co.uk/eba_impact_study.pdf.
41 For a more detailed analysis on the EU sugar regime and its impact on developing countries, see
Oxfam (2002).
42 Each member States has a national Paying and Intervention Agency to collect levies (from
production), to pay the support price, to give export refunds and other functions.21
Domestically, EU countries and producers are given production quotas for sugar A and
B,43 and only these quotas are entitled for price support.44 In addition, when exported
outside the EU, the sugar produced under these quotas is also granted a refund45 (or
subsidy) roughly equal to the difference between the international and domestic (EU
market) prices. Although the EU is prepared to pay the intervention price to buy quotas
of white sugar offered to intervention agencies (when internal EU prices fall below a
trigger price), this has only happened once in the last 20 years (in Germany) and for
small quantities. In fact, domestic prices for sugar have always been well above the
support price, with no need, for sugar producers, to revert to this kind of support.
Therefore, the cost of this system is largely borne by EU consumers (by paying higher
prices) rather than by direct funds from the EU budget. In addition, exporting surplus of
sugar quotas with the support of export refunds appears to be a more attractive option
for sugar producers than selling sugar to an Intervention Agency at the intervention
price. So export refunds rather than domestic support price has been the main financial
support for sugar producers.
Member States are free to produce above quota levels but to avoid the negative impact
that this out of quota sugar (called C sugar) might have on domestic prices, it must be
entirely exported outside the EU market and, further, does not receive any support in
term of export refunds.46
In the context of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and recognizing the likely
negative impact that subsidized exports might have in depressing international prices for
sugar (outside the EU market), the EU has made commitments to reduce the total
quantity of sugar that can be exported with the support of exports refunds and the total
amount of export refunds involved when exporting refined sugar onto international
markets. Once these limits are reached, the EU is expected to reduce quotas47 so as to
eliminate the surplus of quota sugar.48
Besides regulating the prices and quantities of sugar being produced with the Union,
another pillar of the EU sugar regime to sustain internally high prices for sugar is a strict
policy on imports. Market access conditions for sugar in the EU are indeed
extraordinarily stringent, de facto preventing any imports of sugar other than those
provided in the context of the existing preferential trade arrangements (see below). In
                                                
43 A and B sugar quotas differ, inter alia, on the level of the minimum price guaranteed. For more
information on how these different quotas are regulated in the EU market, please refer to Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the common organization of the markets in the
sugar sector.
44 Price support is only given if sugar is actually sold to a national intervention agency.
45 Export refunds is equal to the intervention price plus the storage levy, plus the FOB minus the sugar
world price. Sugar contained in food and drinks also qualifies for exports refunds.
46 The EU monitors closely that this sugar is actually exported.
47  Paragraph 4, article 10, Chapter II of the Council Regulation EC 1260/2001, 2001, OJ L178 of
30.6.2001.
48 This happened in 2002 when the guaranteed quantities under production quotas in the sugar sector
were reduced by 862,475 tonnes, in white sugar equivalent, for the 2002/2003 marketing year. Article
1 of the Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1745/2002 of 30 September 2002.22
fact, although duties on sugar have been bound and, over time, gradually reduced in
accordance to the AoA of the Uruguay Round,49 following the end of the
implementation period (2000/2001) their levels continue to remain prohibitive. In
addition, given the depressed prices for sugar recorded during the recent years in the
international markets, since 1995 the EU has made regular use of the special safeguard
measure under article 5 of same AoA, which allows the imposition of extra duty on
sugar imports each time the c.i.f. price falls below a trigger price set at EUR 531/TON.
The exact amount of such a duty is dependent upon the difference between the two
prices, being higher the larger the gap. The resulting combination of these two duties
has, therefore, made sugar imports only possible through preferential tariffs quotas, with
hardly any importation of non-preferential sugar actually taking place. The EU allows
the importation of raw sugar on a preferential basis under four (including EBA)
different trade arrangements:
1)  ‘Preferential sugar’ originating in ACP countries (Protocol 3 to Annex IV to
the ACP/EC Partnership Agreement) and India;
2)   ‘MFN’ Sugar;
3)  EBA Sugar;
4)  Special Preferential Sugar (SPS).
‘Preferential sugar’
Under the Sugar Protocol 3 of the EU/ACP Partnership Agreement (previously Lomé),
the Community undertakes, for an indefinite period of time, to purchase and import on a
duty-free basis and at guaranteed price50 specific quantities of cane sugar (raw or white
equivalent, see Table 12), originating in 17 ACP countries. Under the EC-India
Agreement, similar treatment is provided to 10,000 tonnes of sugar from India per year.
The ‘MFN’ sugar
Despite its misleading name, ‘MFN’ sugar is actually a preferential tariff quota of raw
sugar (82,000 tonnes) granted by the EU to Cuba (68 per cent), Brazil (28 per cent) and
other few countries. It comes from a previous obligations contracted by Finland within
the GATT. Once Finland joined the EC, this obligation was carried over by the EU.
Such raw sugar is subject to a reduced customs duty of 98 ECU per tonne and its price
is freely negotiated without the support of a minimum guaranteed price. Nevertheless,
because of the high EU price for sugar, it is very likely that the price paid for this sugar
is well above international price and in line with what it is received by EU domestic
producers.
                                                
49 A 20 per cent reduction from a base rate of 524 ECU/tonne till the current 419 ECU/tonnne in six
annual steps.
50 In principle, preferential sugar is entitled to receive the same price support granted to domestic sugar
(under quotas) in case an importer buyer is not willing to pay the guaranteed prices. In practise, given
the high prices in the EU market, this has never happened.23
The EBA Sugar
As mentioned before, under the EBA, the full liberalization of sugar (HS heading 17.01)
for LDC exporters will be phased in between 1 July 2006 and 1 July 2009 by gradually
reducing the Community MFN tariff to zero. In the meantime, LDC raw sugar (HS code
17.01.11.10) can be exported duty free within the limits of a tariff quota, which will
grow from 74,185 tons (white-sugar equivalent) in 2001/2002 to 197,355 tons in
2008/2009 (July to June marketing year).
Tariff quotas for raw sugar from LDCs (tonnes)
2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009
Sugar* 74,185 85,313 98,110 112,827 129,751 149,213 171,595 197,335
* Marketing years: July 2001 to July 2009.
Imports of sugar from LDCs-ACP benefiting from the ACP-EC Sugar Protocol
(Madagascar, Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda) are excluded from the above calculations
so as to uphold the viability of this Protocol for these LDC/ACP Countries. The
applications for licences to imports raw sugar from LDCs within the stated quantities
limits have to be submitted directly by the EU refineries. To this sugar, the EU
guarantees that the refiners pay a minimum purchases price equal to the intervention
price with some adjustments.51
Special Preferential Sugar (SPS)
The final quotas of sugar allowed to enter in the EU market come under the name of
special preferential sugar (SPS). These additional tariff quotas have been created with a
view to ensuring adequate supplies of raw sugar to a number of refineries (seven) of
certain EU members, namely Portugal, the UK, Finland and France where their forecast
Maximum Supply Needs (MSN) cannot be met by alternative supplies of raw sugar.
More specifically the preamble of the Council Regulation 1260/2001 states that: ‘these
quantities (...) are to be determined within the limits of the MSN (...), once all available
raw and cane sugar of community origin and preferential raw sugar and raw sugar
originating in countries benefiting from tariffs quotas under trade concessions granted
by the Community have been refined’.
In other words, the MSN are calculated taking into account all the available balances
from Community sugar, the ‘preferential sugar’, the MFN sugar and now it would
appear also from the EBA sugar. MSN are supposed to be initially filled with imports of
raw sugar from the French Overseas Departments (FOD). If the balance shows that the
amounts available will be still insufficient to meet the maximum needs, additional duty-
free (or highly reduced) tariff quotas, called Special Preferential Sugar (SPS), are
                                                
51 Article 4, of the Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1381/2002 of 29 July 2002.24
created.52 For this sugar EU refineries are due to pay a minimum purchase price equal
to the guaranteed price.53
Article 39 of Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 provides that SPS sugar imports during the
2001/02 to 2005/06 marketing years shall be allocated only among those States with
which the Community has concluded preferential supply agreements. As during the
previous five-year period (1995/96 and 2000/01), at present such agreements have only
been concluded54 with the ACP States party to Protocol 3 on ACP sugar attached to
Annex V to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, and with the Republic of India.
Given as constant the number and capacity of the EU refineries55 and being the
Community sugar regulated by fixed quotas, as it is the case for ‘preferential sugar’,
MFN sugar and now EBA sugar, the only variable quantity for calculating the SPS has
been (and still is) the imports from the French Overseas Departments. Therefore, the
variance over time of SPS tariff quotas has been de facto very limited. Table 13 shows
the Maximum Supply Needs for 2002/2003 as determined by the EU (Commission
regulation (EC) No 1745/2002 of 30 September 2002, Annex III)
The following quotas have been opened for the period 1 July 2002 to 28 February 2003
in respect of imports of raw cane sugar for refining falling within CN code 1701 11 10:
(a) a tariff quota of 173,200 tonnes expressed as white-sugar equivalent originating in
the ACP States and (b) a tariff quota of 10,000 tonnes expressed as white-sugar
equivalent originating in India.56
4.2.4 Implications for traditional sugar exporters:
The transitional period
Bearing in mind the functioning of this system, in the transitional period a number of
factors that might affect the current market access conditions currently enjoyed by
traditional raw cane sugar exports. Some are directly linked to EBA while others are
independent from.
The first one relates to the commitments undertaken by the EU in the context of the
WTO to reduce the total quantity of sugar that can be exported with the support of
exports refunds and the total amount of export refunds involved when exporting refined
sugar onto international markets. In this regard, the EU has already reduced (and
probably will again in the future) its domestic quotas and, accordingly, the MSNs by a
                                                
52 For example in the year 1998/99, SPS quota was set at 334,000 tonnes of white sugar equivalent
(Council Regulation 1375/98 and Comm. Reg. 440/99).
53 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1096/2002 of 24 June 2002.
54 Council Decision 2001/870/EC; OJ L 325, 8.12.2001, p. 21; and Article 35, of Council Regulation
(EC) No. 1260/2001; OJ L 178/1, 30.6.2001.
55 Indeed a penalty might be levied to refineries that import more than the set MSN.
56 Article 1, Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1096/2002 of 24 June 2002.25
similar percentage.57 Not to mention either the forthcoming enlargement of the EU that
will bring in additional sugar supplied from acceding countries, or more commitments
to reduce subsidies coming from current negotiations at the WTO within the Doha’
work programme. In all cases, SPS quotas are bound to be affected.
Secondly, it appears that the EBA tariff quotas are to be taken into account as an
additional component, together with the Community balances of sugar, the ‘preferential
sugar’ and the MFN sugar, in determining the MSNs. As the resulting additional quotas
(the SPS sugar) are created only when all available raw cane and beet sugar of
Community origin and preferential raw sugar originating in countries benefiting from
tariff quotas under trade concessions granted by the Community have been already
refined, the EBA sugar, by increasing supply, undoubtedly reduces the MSNs. Given
the yearly increase of the EBA sugar quotas, it is reasonable to expect that the quantity
of SPS available will be decreasing over the implementing time as MSNs will be
gradually and increasingly filled.
Thirdly, the current countries entitled for SPS preferential quotas are only those part of
the EU/ACP Protocol 3 and India, to which the EU has signed an agreement. The
regulation leaves the door open for negotiating similar arrangements with other
countries. If such agreements were to be effectively signed between the EU and LDCs
(or other countries), SPS quotas’ shares available to traditional sugar exporters would be
reduced even further.58
Finally, a recent dispute opened up by two WTO members against the EU sugar regime,
and in particular on its exports subsidies, if successfully pursued, could significantly
affect all components of this intertwined system. Although at this stage the parties
involved are still undertaking informal consultations to try to settle the matter in an
amicable way, it does represent a first legal step to contend this heavily regulated
system.
The longer period
Following the transitional period, many analyses claim that, eventually, LDC sugar
would substantially erode the current market share enjoyed by ACP countries that are
dependent on preferential market access for their sugar, such as Mauritius and Fiji.
The patterns of LDCs different sugar exports in 2000 to the EU are presented in
comparative perspective in Table 14. The table presents the top exporters of cane sugar
(product code 1701), beet sugar (product code 1702) and molasses (product code 1703).
Only 11 LDCs figure among top 50 sugar exporters in all categories, 6 of them
(Malawi, Madagascar, Tanzania, Congo, Dem. Rep., Zambia, and Myanmar) being
specialized in cane sugar exports, 2 in other sugars (Sierra Leone and Bangladesh),
while Sudan, Senegal, and Mozambique are among the top 25 exporters of molasses
(product code 1703). The most important LDC exporters are Malawi, with cane sugar
exports worth US$20.9 million, and Madagascar, with US$10,6 million. However, even
                                                
57 Because of these commitments, for the 2002/2003 marketing year the presumed maximum supply
needs of Community refineries have been already reduced by 12.588,2 tonnes, in white sugar
equivalent (Article 2 of the Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1745/2002 of 30 September 2002).
58 However at this point in time such agreements are not in place.26
these LDCs account for less than 4 per cent of total EU cane sugar imports. Senegal and
Bangladesh together account for less than 0.01 per cent of EU market for other sugar
(product code 1702). Set against these figures, the fears expressed by the EU sugar
lobby of a massive rise in LDC exports of sugar products appear to be puzzling.
First, the ability of LDCs to erode the market share of EU domestic sugar producers
seems quite limited, based on the trade creation estimates from our simulation in all
scenarios (Figures 3, 9, and 10).
Second, regarding the trade diversion effects, even for the most important sugar product
of interest to LDCs and non-LDC ACP countries – cane sugar – the partial equilibrium
estimates situate the increase in LDC cane sugar exports (products in tariff lines from
section 1701) between roughly US$34 million (scenario 1 with no LDC trade
reorientation) and US$64 million (scenario 2) (see Figures 3 and 10). Scenario 2 took
into account the potential additional exports of LDCs based on a re-orientation of their
current world exports of sugar. While it is true that the expansion in LDC sugar exports
is achieved to a large extent at the expense of other non-LDC ACP exporters,59 this is
far from those extravagant fears that warned about a major market share reshuffle
between LDCs and other ACP countries (see Figures 6, 12, and 15). For instance, EC
(2001a: 16) assumes that LDC exports of sugar can rise to around 2.7 million tonnes
over three years. Our partial equilibrium estimates place this export increase rather
between 50,000 and 100,000 tons, based on EU domestic prices similar to those used by
the EC study. Our results are in line with other studies that predicted more modest
increases in sugar exports from LDCs.60  For instance, according to the SMART
estimates (Table 15), the largest ACP sugar exporters such as Mauritius and Fiji would
see their current level of exports reduced by 5 and 2.4 per cent respectively. More
drastic market share reduction could arise for smaller exporters of preferential sugar to
the EU, such as the Netherlands Antilles (more than 50 per cent), Aruba (25 per cent),
and India (15.3 per cent), who enjoys similar market access conditions as ACP
countries. Despite the fact that these estimates do not allow for LDC trade reorientation,
and consequently can underestimate the likely impact, other factors can limit to a large
extent such major redistributions of current market shares. In addition to the ability of
LDCs to supply the EU market with increased exports of sugar, another constraint stems
from the implicit safeguards mechanisms included in the EBA, both during and after the
expiration of the transition periods.61
The SMART estimates based on LDC world exports show only slightly larger
percentage increases in the exports of top five LDC sugar exporters, the largest increase
being that of Myanmar (110 per cent). But just because LDC exports appear unlikely to
rise massively, it does not mean that some of them may not face unforeseen problems.
                                                
59 Apart from ACP countries that stand to lose the most in terms of market share erosion, other non-ACP
countries may also see a moderate reduction in their market shares. Some of them are efficient
worldwide sugar producers (Brazil and Paraguay) with MFN market access, while others enjoy duty-
free market access under free trade agreements with the EU (Poland and the Czech Republic).
60 See for instance Oxfam and IDS (2001).
61 It should be reminded that during the transition periods, the level of exports allowed within the duty-
free tariff rate quota can only increase at a maximum 15 per cent annually and that after the expiration
of the transition periods, exports that increase by more than 25 per cent annually are subject to an
investigation that may lead to the imposition of safeguard measures.27
Mozambique, for instance, did not benefit from either the ACP Sugar Protocol or SPS
Agreement and consequently could not export cane sugar (product code 1701) to the EU
market under the pre-EBA preferential treatment for LDCs. Under the assumptions of
scenario 2 allowing for a reorientation of exports from third countries to the EU,
Mozambique could potentially export cane sugar worth of around US$16.6m. However,
the EBA stipulates that before the end of the transition period in 2009, LDCs are
allocated duty-free quotas based on an annual 15 per cent increase of their historical
market share in the EU. For Mozambique however, unless other arrangements are
negotiated bilaterally, this means that Mozambique will be unable to export any cane
sugar until 2009. Other LDCs are in a similar position.
Our estimates did not factor in any potential increases in exports from re-allocation of
LDC sugar consumption from domestic sugar to imported sugar from third countries.
Nor did it take into account any potential increase in supply capacity of LDCs as a result
of the preferential market access offered by the EBA (see Box 1). In the longer term, as
long as CAP policies maintain a price differential between EU domestic prices and
world prices, both of these effects are likely to occur as LDC producers will have strong
incentive to further increase exports to the European Union.
Box 1: The case of sugar industry in Sudan
Sudan is the Middle East’s only net sugar exporter, with total sales at around
241154 metric tons, according to COMTRADE statistics. At present, the majority of
Sudan’s exports are marketed within the Common Market for East and Southern
Africa (COMESA) region, notably to Kenya and Uganda under preferential terms of
the free-trade agreement. Sudan also exports sugar to other African markets,
including other LDCs such as Madagascar, Tanzania, Chad and Niger. The key
market that Sudan wishes to tap, however, is the EU, which currently has a quota
limit of 30,000 tons per year on Sudanese sugar imports (EIU 2002). This level will
rise by an agreed 15 per cent a year, and will have doubled by 2006. Trade with
the EU is particularly attractive as the sugar is purchased at the official EU price of
around 650 euro/tonne. This compares very favourably with an open market rate in
August 2002 of approximately US$220/tonne (white sugar, fob).62 However, so far
Sudan has not been able to take full advantage of these preferential market access
opportunities.
Sugar production is also set to show further growth. Kenana Sugar Company
(owned by other Arab and Western private and government investors) is, according
to the company records, the largest integrated sugar plant in the world and appears
well placed to attract further foreign interest. Other Gulf countries and Turkey have
been reported to be examining opportunities in the Sudanese sugar industry (EIU
2002).
                                                
62 Based on information available from White Sugar London Daily Price Report, available at
http://www.liffe.com/NFP/statsugar#sugar1.28
5 Conclusions
The idea of trade preferences is to contribute to development through the expansion of
exports from beneficiary countries by generating increased investment, growth and
employment, and the diversification of the production base away from a heavy reliance
on the production of primary commodities. Indeed, the relative success of those
countries that have been able to diversify into manufactures seems to lend support to
this basic premise. On the other hand, LDCs have remained heavily dependent on
commodities and have seen their share of world trade decline. The idea of the EBA
initiative and similar programmes is to try to lift the trade performance of the LDCs and,
hence, their overall economic development.
Improved non-preferential (MFN) market access opportunities, bound within a WTO
multilateral negotiations, would also be helpful and would be more secure than
unilaterally granted preferences. However, in sensitive sectors, there would be heavy
resistance to such general liberalization. Moreover, the gains to LDCs would also be
dissipated, and it may well be that the enhanced trade opportunities would be snapped
up by other developing countries with greater supply capacity, as has happened in the
GSP. In the longer term, progressive MFN liberalization is inevitable, but the temporary
competitive ‘edge’ provided by preferences may help the LDCs and other developing
countries catch up with the more developed countries.
Two disadvantages of preferences are, first, that the preferences may induce
beneficiaries to specialize in activities in which they may never become competitive,
and, second, that they create vested interests opposed to multilateral trade liberalization.
Inappropriate specialization may be particularly acute where preferential access entails
economic transfers arising from privileged access behind high non-tariff barriers, as has
been the case, for example, with certain agricultural preferences. Not only is the reversal
of reliance on such high rent transfers likely to prove extremely painful unless it is
carefully managed over an extended period, but the preferences themselves have
perpetuated mono-cultural dependence rather than promoting diversification of the
production base.
Experience shows that GSP and other unilateral preference schemes have had only
moderate success in generating significant export opportunities that have been captured
by the more advanced developing countries. Of course, improvements could be made to
the various preferential schemes, as has been recognized by the donors themselves.
Greater simplicity and stability of coverage, improved rules of origin, more transparent
competitive needs exclusions and so on are factors. It is recognized that the simplicity
and stability of the Japanese scheme have contributed to relatively higher share of
preferential trade in total imports and high utilization of the scheme. In this sense, the
apparent simplicity and absence of restrictions in the EBA initiative imply that it could
be important in generating new trade from the world’s poorest countries, whose
commodity-oriented exports have done badly in recent years by comparison with other
countries.
Overall, our study shows moderate, but useful, welfare and trade gains from the EBA
initiative, with the largest gains being recorded for sub-Saharan Africa. Our CGE and
the highly disaggregated partial equilibrium (PE) analyses both indicate that gains are
likely to occur in relatively few sectors, although the gains are more dispersed in
Scenario 2 of our PE analysis (with LDC exports to the world as our benchmark). Both29
the CGE and PE analyses highlight the significance of improved access for LDCs to the
EU sugar market as the single most important source of change. This derives in the first
instance from the substantial price wedge that exists between EU domestic and world
prices in this sector.
In our analyses, the effects on the EU itself are minimal, but the increased market access
for LDCs comes mostly at the expense of other preference-receiving countries (ACP
countries in particular), although again the changes are not enormous. There are some
very minor negative effects on other countries that currently enjoy duty-free access to
the EU market or MFN market access, for example, Polish and Romanian exports of
live animals or US and Argentine exports of cereals.
Overall, our analysis shows that, rather than being ‘everything but (f)arms’, the largest
sectoral impact likely to occur from the EBA initiative, results from the increase in
sugar exports from non-ACP LDCs. However, the analysis does not fully account for
non-tariff barriers affecting trade flows (such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
technical barriers to trade, rules of origin, safeguards, etc.) that may preclude LDCs
from increasing their exports to the extent predicted by our analyses. In addition, in the
longer term, for many items, supply-side factors constraints rather than limitations on
market access limitations may be the more important constraints and need the urgent
attention of the international community. Even the most generous market access
enhancements alone may not be sufficient to strengthen the links between trade and
development in the poorest countries in the world.
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European Union: major imports from LDCs, 2000 




Share of LDCs 






090500  Vanilla  22 666  84.80  6.00  0 
260500  Cobalt ores and concentrates  110 753  83.06  0  0 
330126  Essential oils and resinoids  3 281  77.75  1.15  0 
130120  Gum Arabic  28 780  77.35  0  0 
230500  Residues and waste from the food industry  20 321  76.25  0  0 
530310  Vegetable textile fibres  2 276  76.14  0  0 
430130  Raw furskins  10 999  72.66  0  0 
530710  Vegetable textile fibres  18 075  72.23  0  0 
530390  Vegetable textile fibres  253  64.43  0  0 
260600  Aluminium ores and concentrates  367 985  63.16  0  0 
090700  Cloves   3 075  61.14  8.00  0 
560729  Twine, cordage, ropes and cables  2 602  60.26  12.00  0 
030333  Fish  5 003  58.56  7.50  0 
410310  Raw hides and skins  3 852  58.07  0  0 
150810  Crude oil  115 519  55.67  3.20  0 
630510  Sacks and bags  23 209  55.18  3.00  0 
121299  Oil seed, oleagi fruits  31 335  53.60  0  0 
120300  Oil seed, oleagi fruits  42 742  51.96  0  0 
110319  Groats and meal   43  44.19  –  – 
530720  Vegetable textile fibres  55 126  44.03  0  0 
120720  Cotton seeds  38 576  42.02  0  0 
530410  Vegetable textile fibres  25 755  41.93  0  0 
710210  Diamonds  225 661  41.92  0  0 
030339  Fish   9 450  41.67  11.25  0 
030759  Octopus   252 975  39.96  8.00  0 
081090  Edible fruits and nuts  107 523  37.02  5.60  0 
030270  Livers and roes  5 032  36.86  10.00  0 
240310  Tobacco  1 795  36.66  74.90  0 
530890  Vegetable textile fibres  2 303  36.56  3.87  0 
620530  Not knitted apparel  536 965  35.92  12.00  0 
 
Source: UN Comtrade and UNCTAD Trains Database. 
Legend: 30 HS6 categories with highest import share from LDCs. 
Tariff data refers to ad valorem tariffs only. Table 2 
Selected LDC exports facing tariffs in the EU, by major product category, 2000 
Product code 
HS 2 digit 
Description  Number of dutiable 
lines 
at HS 6-digit 
11  Malt, starches, wheat gluten  29 
02  Meat and edible meat offal  27 
04  Dairy products; birds' eggs; natural honey  20 
19  Flour, starch, pastry products  15 
17  Sugars and sugar confectionery  14 
10  Cereals  12 
22  Beverages, spirits and vinegar  11 
08  Edible fruit and nuts  10 
Source: UNCTAD. 
Table 3 
EBA: the distribution of liberalized products, by sectors (HS 2-digit) 
 
HS 2 code  Description 
LDCs export share 




products (8 digit 
level)b 
Per cent of 
liberalized tariff 
lines b 
02  Meat and meat products  0.007  173  18.82 
04  Diary products  0.008  166  18.21 
22  Beverages, spirits and vinegar  0.033  103  11.21 
11  Milled products  0.005  77  8.38 
20  Preparation of vegetables and fruits  0.054  74  8.05 
10  Cereals  0.114  48  5.22 
17  Sugars and sugar confectionery  1.269  45  4.9 
19  Preparation of cereals  0.005  38  4.13 
01  Live animals  0.111  30  3.26 
23  Residues and waste from food industry  0.089  30  3.26 
16  Prep of meat, fish or crustaceans  0.799  28  3.05 
08  Fruits  0.460  25  2.72 
07  Vegetables  0.496  19  2.07 
18  Cocoa and cocoa preparations  0.478  19  2.07 
21  Miscellaneous edible preparations  0.013  12  1.31 
15  Fats and oils  0.201  10  1.09 
38  Miscellaneous chemical products  0.004  8  0.87 
35  Albumins and enzymes  0.043  6  0.65 
29  Organic chemicals  0.035  5  0.54 
12  Oil seeds  1.212  3  0.33 
  Total  0.175  919  100 
Source: a. WITS; b. Based on information available from the European Commission 
(www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/pdf/ebaprodlist.pdf) 
 Table 4 
Protection rates applied in the EU on merchandise trade 




















World  Total 
Paddy rice  64.9  64.9  64.9  64.9  64.9  64.9  64.9  64.9  61.7  61.7  61.7  61.7  61.7  61.7  61.7  64.9  64.9  1081 
Cereals  51.3  45  45.1  48.7  41.2  60  47  50.9  28.6  28.5  28.6  28.6  28.6  29.1  37  51.1  47.2  697 
Vegetables, fruits and nuts  14.5  14.5  14.5  14.5  14.5  14.5  14.5  14.5  2.2  14.5  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2  14.5  14.5  173 
Oil seeds  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Sugar cane, sugar beet  251.4  251.4  251.4  251.4  251.4  251.4  251.4  251.4  0  224  223.7  223.7  223.7  223.7  246.4  251.4  251.4  3879 
Natural fibers   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Crops  3.1  3.1  3.1  3.1  3.1  3.1  3.1  3.1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  3.1  3.1  30.9 
Livestock, animal product  16.9  7.6  32.6  7.9  7.8  8  16.9  9  2.7  3.7  4.3  3.5  3.1  3  6.3  14.4  11.6  159 
Forestry  3  0.9  0.1  1.5  3.1  0.1  0.1  3.5  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  4.2  0.1  16.5 
Fishing  8.9  3.3  1.4  4.1  10.5  0  9.1  12  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  9.7  8  66.9 
Coal, oil gas and minerals  1.8  5.1  3.5  2.1  0.6  0  1.5  0.4  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.4  2.3  17.7 
Meat and meat products  69.7  34.1  61.1  34.6  65.3  79  38.1  77.5  5.7  5.3  5.9  6  11.1  8.2  13.4  45.7  54.5  615 
Vegetable oils and fats  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  11.4  11.4  116 
Dairy products  86.9  66.9  87.5  53  76.3  87.6  84.9  39.7  35.1  32.7  27.8  24.7  1.6  17.3  34.6  42.9  75.2  875 
Processed rice  87.4  87.4  87.4  87.4  87.4  87.4  87.4  87.4  87.4  87.4  87.4  87.4  87.4  87.4  87.4  87.4  87.4  1485 
Sugar  76.4  76.4  76.4  76.4  76.4  76.4  76.4  76.4  68  68  68  68  68  68  74.9  76.4  76.4  1247 
Other food products  28.8  28.8  28.8  28.8  28.8  28.8  28.8  28.8  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  28.8  28.8  290 
Beverage and tobacco products  8.3  8.3  8.3  8.3  8.3  8.3  8.3  8.3  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  1.3  8.3  8.3  85.1 
Textiles, apparel and leather  8.8  10.5  8.7  10.5  6.7  0.7  10.9  11.4  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  11.1  11.5  90.8 
Other manufactures  3.3  4.5  5.1  4  2.9  0.1  4  2.8  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  4  3.8  34.5 Table 5 





Terms of trade 
effects  Total 
NAFTA  0.2  -17.9  -26.4 
EU  -24.0  -186.9  -212.3 
China  -0.7  8.6  4.2 
Japan  -2.9  -14.9  -24.3 
Rest of Asia  -5.8  -11.6  -20.9 
Latin America  -0.4  -4.1  -7.7 
Rest of developed countries  4.2  4.3  7.6 
Transitions economies  2.4  2.4  3.9 
Rest of Africa  -2.4  -5.8  -8.5 
Malawi  10.0  23.6  31.6 
Zambia  -5.3  34.2  27.4 
Mozambique  1.1  2.9  6.7 
Tanzania  12.9  28.3  52.2 
Uganda  0.2  1.1  1.7 
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa  35.8  119.0  174.1 
Bangladesh  0.2  1.4  2.0 
Middle East  4.1  14.4  18.1 
Rest of the World  -0.8  -0.6  -2.3 
Total  28.8  -1.5  27.2 
 Table 6 
Aggregate trade data (percentage changes) 
 
Regions  Exports changes 
Terms of trade 
effects 
NAFTA  -0.000  -0.001 
EU  0.011  -0.008 
China  0.002  0.002 
Japan  0.002  -0.003 
Rest of Asia  -0.001  -0.002 
Latin America  -0.002  -0.002 
Rest of developed countries  -0.000  0.002 
Transition economies  -0.002  0.001 
Rest of Africa  -0.006  -0.006 
Malawi  3.547  3.734 
Zambia  2.253  3.135 
Mozambique  -0.772  0.661 
Tanzania  3.872  2.511 
Uganda  0.131  0.151 
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa  0.440  0.284 
Bangladesh  0.033  0.027 
Middle East  0.001  0.006 
Rest of the World  -0.009  -0.002 Table 7 
Exports, percentage changes 
 










Rest of  
Africa  Malawi  Zambia  Mozambique  Tanzania  Uganda 
Rest of  
sub-
Saharan 






Paddy rice  -0.57  -2.25  -0.81  1.32  -1.33  -0.67  -0.43  -0.21  0  30.16  139.2  199.8  243.16  266  363.4  23.35  -0.93  -0.98 
Cereals  -0.01  -0.09  -0.02  0.19  -0.02  -0.01  0.01  -0.03  0.68  32.1  28.8  6.02  66.33  12.31  30.77  35.59  -0.06  -0.02 
Vegetables, fruits and nuts  -0.02  -0.12  0.05  0.01  0.01  -0.07  0.03  -0.07  -0.11  -8.68  49.46  -1.63  -7.67  4.15  5.87  7.3  -0.12  0.1 
Oil seeds  0.02  0.05  0.03  0.02  0.06  0.02  0.05  0.03  0.16  -8.94  -19.75  -1.25  -8.84  -0.45  -1.6  -0.23  0  0.08 
Sugar cane, sugar beet  -0.04  -69.69  -0.46  -32.44  -25.41  -25.03  0.74  -1.04  -27.33  31.24  403.7  816.5  1063.1  2808  1266  1085  -29.91  -13.63 
Natural fibers   0.2  0.34  0.23  0.29  0.24  0.27  0.23  0.19  0.35  -7.37  -16.86  -1.23  -5.42  -0.23  -1.24  0.24  0.3  0.33 
Crops (nec.)  0.25  0.42  0.28  0.27  0.28  0.29  0.33  0.45  0.4  -9.09  -18.74  -1.98  -7.94  -0.15  -1.17  0.15  0.3  0.37 
Livestock, animal products  -0.01  0  -0.04  -0.01  0  -0.02  -0.04  -0.08  -0.03  -4.73  -14.66  4.16  -7.06  4.84  5.71  2.29  -0.1  -0.02 
Forestry  0.1  0.18  0.11  0.19  0.16  0.18  0.1  0.13  0.16  -16.15  -11.41  -2.75  -12.21  -0.65  -1.04  0.05  0.18  0.12 
Fishing  -0.01  -0.04  -0.01  0  0  0.01  -0.01  0.02  -0.01  -16.23  -11.64  -2.42  -14.09  -0.88  -1.38  -0.18  -0.04  -0.01 
Coal oil gas and minerals  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.01  0.02  -10.46  -4.3  -1.83  -7.04  -0.41  -0.49  -0.04  0.01  0.03 
Meat and meat products  -0.01  0.01  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03  -5.3  -5.77  -1.51  3.8  45.64  21.65  -0.04  -0.02  0 
Vegetable oils and fats  0  0.03  -0.01  -0.06  0.02  0  0  -0.03  -0.02  -11.71  -16.38  -1.78  -7.08  0.43  -0.47  0.13  0  -0.01 
Dairy products  -0.03  0.01  -0.03  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.03  -0.04  0.02  74.16  24.84  -1.9  59.93  2.05  12.1  56.12  -0.03  -0.01 
Processed rice  -0.67  -6.04  -0.67  -2.62  -0.38  -1.2  -0.39  -2.15  0.01  -5  212.3  379.3  471.02  158  452  385.4  -0.88  -2.04 
Sugar  -1.17  -5.23  -0.8  -1.23  -1.07  -1.37  -0.18  -1.47  -7.72  468.7  429  19.35  680.47  293  391.7  264.7  -1.25  -8.52 
Other food products  -0.01  0.05  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.04  -0.04  0.01  -11.58  -10.5  -1.26  -7.15  0.22  -0.34  0.35  -0.05  -0.03 
Beverage and tobacco products  -0.06  0.07  -0.06  -0.05  -0.06  -0.06  -0.1  -0.07  0.13  -18.66  -18.49  -2.95  -12  -0.83  1.91  -0.14  -0.04  -0.04 
Textiles, apparel and leather  0  0.03  0  0.01  0.01  0.02  0  0.01  0.03  -20.62  -13.17  -3.37  -11.84  -0.92  -1.92  -0.17  -0.01  0.03 
Other manufactures  0  0.02  -0.01  0  0  0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.13  -18  -8.65  -2.13  -8.9  -0.45  -1.35  -0.11  -0.01  0.01 
Services  0.01  0.02  0.07  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  -10.14  -5.17  -1.64  -6.59  -0.35  -0.87  -0.07  0  0.01 
Note: not elsewhere classified (nec.). 
 Table 8 
Change in exports (million 1997 US$) 



















the World  LDCs 
Paddy rice  -1.89  -4.15  -0.79  0.01  -5.15  -1.27  -0.12  -0.01  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  1.95  0.00  7.63  0.00  -0.02  -0.06  9.61 
Cereals  -1.49  -6.92  -0.19  0.00  -0.02  -0.32  0.25  -0.31  2.74  0.29  0.29  0.20  7.56  0.18  7.91  0.00  -0.14  -0.01  16.43 
Vegetables, fruits and nuts  -1.57  -20.95  0.69  0.01  0.22  -4.28  0.37  -0.72  -1.59  -0.36  3.41  -0.46  -6.01  0.42  38.73  0.42  -3.22  0.43  36.14 
Oil seed  1.83  0.79  0.09  0.00  0.21  0.59  0.09  0.23  0.12  -0.38  -0.57  -0.07  -1.05  -0.01  -2.61  0.00  0.00  0.09  -4.69 
Sugar cane, sugar beet  0.00  -8.57  0.00  0.00  -3.53  -0.78  0.00  -0.07  -0.16  0.00  0.00  0.00  51.03  0.00  11.39  0.00  -0.66  -0.25  62.42 
Natural fibers   5.83  2.27  0.16  0.01  1.40  1.73  6.70  4.03  1.34  -0.43  -2.11  -0.28  -7.24  -0.04  -14.78  0.22  1.60  0.08  -24.66 
Crops (nec.)  11.39  36.61  3.86  0.38  13.30  31.11  1.53  1.77  4.01  -38.21  -5.49  -0.10  -18.22  -0.65  -46.40  0.05  3.25  1.80  -109.03 
Livestock, animal products  -0.50  0.00  -0.69  -0.01  0.00  -0.13  -0.70  -1.06  -0.09  -0.03  -0.13  0.01  -1.04  0.37  5.90  0.18  -0.43  -0.03  5.27 
Forestry  2.28  2.72  0.17  0.05  2.37  0.69  0.66  2.15  0.19  -0.05  -0.51  -0.31  -3.04  -0.01  -13.49  0.00  0.08  1.19  -17.42 
Fishing  -0.14  -1.25  -0.09  0.00  0.00  0.05  -0.14  0.06  -0.02  -0.06  -0.05  -0.03  -0.61  -0.01  -1.12  -0.04  -0.02  -0.03  -1.92 
Coal oil gas and minerals  19.06  30.76  2.69  2.45  3.93  15.52  8.03  5.90  6.67  -1.41  -0.98  -0.21  -0.65  -0.16  -91.12  -0.04  11.51  1.13  -94.58 
Meat and meat products  -1.00  2.43  -0.32  -0.01  -0.12  -0.73  -0.97  -0.68  -0.08  -0.01  -0.05  -0.02  0.22  0.14  1.56  0.00  -0.03  0.00  1.83 
Vegetable oils and fats  0.00  2.95  -0.06  -0.03  1.53  0.00  0.00  -0.20  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.01  -0.39  0.00  -1.04  0.00  0.00  -0.03  -1.57 
Dairy products  -0.31  2.09  -0.02  -0.01  -0.05  -0.10  -1.31  -0.46  0.02  0.07  0.02  -0.03  0.06  0.02  0.62  0.06  -0.03  -0.01  0.83 
Processed rice  -4.01  -43.29  -2.10  -1.19  -10.24  -5.77  -0.49  -0.98  0.01  -0.04  0.42  0.00  3.77  0.47  104.86  6.55  -0.16  -0.39  116.04 
Sugar  -3.71  -169.15  -1.25  -0.08  -15.98  -52.28  -1.19  -8.21  -62.79  83.89  104.67  3.23  58.52  0.59  320.78  0.79  -0.59  -12.29  572.47 
Other food products  -1.65  24.52  -0.60  -0.20  -2.81  -2.21  -2.98  -1.99  0.19  -0.08  -0.25  -1.14  -5.88  0.06  -5.93  1.14  -0.93  -0.41  -12.07 
Beverages and tobacco products  -5.38  22.25  -0.88  -0.29  -0.59  -1.19  -1.43  -1.27  0.37  -0.32  -0.17  -0.01  -2.12  -0.01  0.50  0.00  -0.14  -0.11  -2.13 
Textiles apparel and leather  0.00  39.66  0.00  0.89  6.92  3.23  0.00  1.63  2.72  -10.33  -5.35  -0.41  -5.80  -0.02  -14.18  -6.38  -1.31  1.65  -42.48 
Other manufactures  0.00  299.66  -24.43  0.00  0.00  6.32  -12.11  -11.27  36.29  -1.60  -57.23  -0.81  -6.89  -0.11  -77.12  -0.30  -4.09  1.05  -144.05 
Services  25.11  87.52  40.98  6.31  10.33  6.83  4.48  4.65  2.18  -8.83  -13.72  -2.48  -22.20  -0.46  -50.09  -0.54  0.00  1.39  -98.33 
Total  43.84  299.95  17.21  8.31  1.72  -2.99  0.67  -6.82  -7.96  22.06  22.15  -2.93  41.95  0.78  181.99  2.10  4.66  -4.79  268.11 
Note: not elsewhere classified (nec.). 
  
Table 9 
Price differentials between the EU and world market 





Sugar  650  250  160 
Sheep Meat  3333  1476  126 
Butter  2954  1307  126 
Rice (milled)  600  300  100 
Whole milk powder  2605  1384  88 
Bananas  660  360  83 
Cheese  3500  2154  62 
Beef Meat  2780  1776  57 
Maize  140  92  52 
Skimmed milk powder  2055  1419  45 
Poultry  1335  977  37 
Tomatoes  787  633  24 
Wheat  133  118  13 
Citrus fruit  485  467  4 
Pig meat  1120  1113  1 
Source: EC (2000a: 7). 
Table 10 
Scenario 2 – Trade effects: wheat bran and other residues (HS product code 2302301000) 
(US$’000s) 
 
Country  Exports  Trade creation  Trade diversion 
Malawi  6  2.2  1.3 
Benin  27  10.8  6.5 
Burkina Faso  28  11  6.6 
Madagascar  53  20.9  12.7 
Zambia  54  21.3  12.9 
Niger  78  31.1  18.8 
Uganda  81  32.3  19.5 
Guinea-Bissau  87  34.7  21.0 
Yemen  90  35.9  21.7 
Togo  98  38.9  23.5 
Sierra Leone  176  70  42.0 
Mozambique  485  193.2  113.5 
Guinea  520  207.3  121.5 
Democratic Republic of the Congo  1063  423.6  237.5 
United Republic of Tanzania  1170  466.3  258.8  
Table 11 
Scenario 2 – Trade effects: broken rice (produce code 1006400010) (US$’000s) 
Country  Exports  Trade creation  Trade diversion  Total 
Maldives  2  0.5  0.8  1.3 
Djibouti  2  0.6  1.1  1.7 
Uganda  5  1.5  2.4  3.9 
Afghanistan  5  1.5  2.4  3.9 
Yemen  10  3.2  5.3  8.5 
Benin  21  6.7  10.9  17.6 
Mozambique  29  9.4  15.4  24.8 
Cambodia  53  17.2  28.1  45.3 
Burkina Faso  60  19.5  31.8  51.3 
Myanmar  89  28.9  47.2  76.1 
United Republic of Tanzania  130  42.2  68.8  111 
Mali  197  63.9  104.1  168 
Niger  1386  449.7  706.4  1156.1 
Togo  2362  766.3  1166.8  1933.1 
Table 12 
Sugar quotas allocation under the preferential sugar 
Barbados  50.312  Mauritius  487 200 
Belize  40.348  Christopher and Nevis  15.000 
PR Congo  10 000  Swaziland  116.400 
Fiji  163.600  Tanzania  10.000 
Guyana  157.700  Trinidad-Tobago  69.000 
Côte d’Ivoire  10.000  Uganda  5.000 
Jamaica  118.300  Zimbabwe  30.000 
Kenya  5.000  All ACP  1.294.700 
Madagascar  10.000  India  10.000 
Malawi  20.000  Total  1.304.700 
 
Quantities expressed in metric tons of ‘white-sugar equivalent’ for delivery in each 12-month period. 
Table 13 
Maximum supply needs for 2002/2003 
Breakdown by member state of the 
presumed refinery supply needs 
Maximum supply needs, in 
tonnes of white sugar 
Finland   59 500,40 
Metropolitan France   294 525,40 
Mainland Portugal   289 566,80 
United Kingdom   1 120 585,10 
Total MSN 2002/2203  1.764.178,00  
Table 14 
EU: top sugar exporters and their market share, 2000 (thousands US dollars) 
  Sugar 
  1701  1702  1703 
  Country   Value
Market 
share 
(%)  Country   Value
Market 
share 




1  Mauritius  207645 24.59 Israel  19508 49.63  Pakistan  64748 33.28
2  Fiji  110104 13.04 Canada  15168 38.59  India  20199 10.38
3  Guyana  108305 12.82 United States  14360 36.53  Poland  17684 9.09
4  Jamaica  76756 9.09 Turkey  3698 9.41  Egypt, Arab Rep.  16014 8.23
5  Swaziland  75177 8.90 Mexico  3673 9.35  United States  14698 7.55
6  Trinidad and Tobago  29675 3.51 Hungary  1357 3.45  Sudan  9993 5.14
7  Barbados  25785 3.05 Slovak Republic  895 2.28  Cuba  8263 4.25
8  Cuba  23753 2.81 Argentina  739 1.88  South Africa  7265 3.73
9  Belize  23677 2.80 South Africa  638 1.62  Morocco  7128 3.66
10  Zimbabwe  22685 2.69 Japan  571 1.45  Mexico  4167 2.14
11  Malawi  20970 2.48 Switzerland  540 1.37  Guatemala  3606 1.85
12  Brazil  19113 2.26 New Zealand  312 0.79  Lithuania  3603 1.85
13  Aruba  17400 2.06 Côte d'Ivoire  284 0.72  Mauritius  3193 1.64
14  Côte d'Ivoire  13230 1.57 China  233 0.59  Iran, Islamic Rep.  2941 1.51
15  Madagascar  10600 1.26 Bulgaria  207 0.53  Senegal  2252 1.16
16  St Kitts and Nevis  8354 1.26 Thailand  190 0.48  Slovak Republic  1759 0.90
17  Tanzania  7864 0.99 Norway  172 0.44 Syrian Arab Republic  1277 0.66
18  Congo, Rep.  7109 0.93 Costa Rica  85 0.22  Latvia  996 0.51
19  Zambia  5393 0.84 Brazil  64 0.16  Guyana  723 0.37
20  Myanmar  3366 0.64 Indonesia  56 0.14  Turkey  705 0.36
21  United States  2907 0.40 Czech Republic  54 0.14  Macao  664 0.34
22  South Africa  2880 0.34 Lebanon  35 0.09  Venezuela  620 0.32
23  Bahamas, The  2862 0.34 Saudi Arabia  34 0.09  Mozambique  503 0.26
24  Poland  2453 0.34 Sri Lanka  28 0.07  Russian Federation  418 0.21
25  Paraguay  1916 0.29 Pakistan  27 0.07 
Ethiopia (excludes 
Eritrea)  368 0.19
26  Netherlands Antilles  1872 0.23 Slovenia  23 0.06  Slovenia  235 0.12
27  Norway  1570 0.22 Singapore  20 0.05  Algeria  143 0.07
28  Czech Republic  1471 0.19 Malaysia  18 0.04  Austria  111 0.06
29  Turkey  1181 0.17 Hong Kong, China  17 0.04  Brazil  96 0.05
30  Kenya  1044 0.14 Korea, Republic  16 0.04  Norway  67 0.03
31  Switzerland  974 0.12 Sierra Leone  15 0.04  Paraguay  25 0.01
32  El Salvador  912 0.12 Australia  15 0.04  Thailand  21 0.01
33  India  859 0.11 Latvia  13 0.03  Costa Rica  18 0.01
34  Argentina  837 0.10 India  10 0.03  Czech Republic  17 0.01
35  Costa Rica  822 0.10 Poland  10 0.03  Singapore  12 0.01
36  United Arab Emirates  410 0.10 Jamaica  9 0.02  China  10 0.01
37  Colombia  405 0.05 Iceland  8 0.02       
38  Croatia  390 0.05 United Arab Emirates  7 0.02       
39  Hungary  384 0.05 Malta  7 0.02       
40  Philippines  300 0.05 Papua New Guinea  6 0.02       
41  China  281 0.04 Trinidad and Tobago  6 0.02       
42  Ecuador  234 0.03 Bangladesh  6 0.02       
43  Estonia  216 0.03 Nicaragua  6 0.01       
44  Bulgaria  164 0.03 Colombia  4 0.01       
45  Sri Lanka  61 0.02 Morocco  4 0.01       
46  Australia  55 0.01 Ukraine  3 0.01       
47  Thailand  48 0.01 Cyprus  3 0.01       
48  Slovak Republic  44 0.01            
49  Guatemala  37 0.01          
Source: WITS – Comtrade LDCs underlined.  
Table 15 
Cane sugar: market share changes 
Country 
Scenario 1  
Percentage change  
in current exports (%) 
Malawi  81.5 
Zambia  78.9 
Tanzania  78.0 
Myanmar  55.3 
Madagascar  51.5 
Barbados*  -1.0 
South Africa*  -1.7 
Swaziland*  -2.4 
Jamaica*  -2.4 
Guyana*  -2.4 
Fiji*  -2.4 
United States  -3.4 
Mauritius*  -5.0 
Brazil  -7.9 
Côte d'Ivoire*  -11.1 
Paraguay  -11.7 
India*  -15.3 
Aruba*  -24.9 
Netherlands Antilles*  -53.3 
Legend: Countries followed by * are non-LDC ACP countries.  
ANNEX 1: REGIONAL AND SECTORAL AGGREGATIONS 
Regional aggregation 
 
Region  Comprising 
NAFTA  Canada; United States; Mexico 
European Union  Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; 
United Kingdom; Greece; Ireland; Italy; Luxembourg; 
Netherlands; Portugal; Spain; Sweden 
China  China; Hong Kong; Taiwan 
Japan  Japan 
Rest of Asia  Korea; Indonesia; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; 
Thailand; Vietnam; India; Sri Lanka; Rest of South Asia 
Latin America  Central America, Caribbean; Colombia; Peru; Venezuela; 
Rest of Andean Pact; Argentina; Brazil; Chile; Uruguay; Rest 
of South America 
Rest of developed  Australia; New Zealand; Switzerland; Rest of EFTA 
Transition economies  Hungary; Poland; Rest of Central European Assoc; Former 
Soviet Union 
Rest of Africa  Morocco; Rest of North Africa; Botswana; Rest of SACU 
(Namibia, RSA); Zimbabwe; Other Southern Africa (Angola, 
Mauritius) 
Malawi  Malawi 
Zambia  Zambia 
Mozambique  Mozambique 
Tanzania  Tanzania 
Uganda  Uganda 
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa  Rest of sub-Saharan Africa 
Bangladesh  Bangladesh 
Middle East  Turkey; Rest of the Middle East 
Rest of the world  Rest of the world  
Sectoral aggregation 
 
Sector  Comprising 
Paddy rice  Paddy rice 
Cereals  Wheat; cereal grains (nec.) 
Vegetables, fruit, nuts  Vegetables, fruit, nuts 
Oil seeds  Oil seeds 
Sugar cane, sugar beet  Sugar cane, sugar beet 
Natural fibers  Plant-based fibers; wool, silk-worm cocoons 
Crops (nec.)  Crops (nec.) 
Livestock, animal products  Cattle, sheep, goats, horses; animal products (nec.) 
Forestry  Forestry 
Fishing  Fishing 
Coal oil gas and minerals  Coal; oil; gas; minerals (nec.); petroleum, coal products; 
mineral products (nec.) 
Meat and meat products  Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse; meat products (nec.) 
Vegetable oils and fats  Vegetable oils and fats 
Dairy products  Raw milk; dairy products 
Processed rice  Processed rice 
Sugar  Sugar 
Other food products  Food products (nec.) 
Beverages and tobacco 
products 
Beverages and tobacco products 
Textiles apparel and leather  Textiles; wearing apparel; leather products 
Other manufactures  Wood products; paper products, publishing; chemical, 
rubber, plastic products; ferrous metals; metals (nec.); metal 
products; motor vehicles and parts; transport equipment 
(nec.); electronic equipment; machinery and equipment 
(nec.); manufactures (nec.) 
Services  Electricity; gas manufacture, distribution; water; construction; 
trade; transport (nec.); sea transport; air transport; 
communication; financial services (nec.); insurance; 
business services (nec.); recreation and other services; 
public administration/defence/health/education; dwellings 
 
Note: not elsewhere classified (nec.).  
ANNEX 2: PRODUCT CODES AND DESCRIPTION 
 
Product codes at tariff line level included in Figures 3-15 fall within these broad product 
categories and descriptions: 
 
HS 6 Code  Short description 
010410  Sheep 
020110  Carcasses and half-carcasses 
020410  Carcasses and half-carcasses of lamb, fresh or chilled 
070990  Other vegetables, fresh or chilled 
080300  Bananas, including plantains, fresh or dried 
100590  Maize seed 
100620  Husked (brown) rice 
100630  Semi-milled or wholly milled rice, whether or not polished or glazed 
100640  Broken rice 
100700  Grain sorghum 
110100  Wheat or meslin flour 
170111  Raw sugar not containing added flavouring or colouring matter – cane sugar 
170112  Raw sugar not containing added flavouring or colouring matter – beet sugar 
170191  Raw sugar – containing added flavouring or colouring matter 
170199  Refined sugars 
170310  Cane molasses 
230230  Bran, sharps, and other wheat residues derived from milling 
 






t P C +












A  B  D 
F  H 
B S  
C 
























Exports from B after PTA 

























































































































































































































































































































































Bananas  Rice  
Figure 4 























Product codes  
Figure 5 
Scenario 1: Trade diversion: most affected countries and products – trade effects bigger than US$100,000 (in US$’000s) 
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Product codes  
Figure 6 




































































































































































































































































































































































Raw cane sugar, in solid form -- For refining Raw cane sugar, in solid form -- Other
Cane or beet sugar, in solid form, nes -- Cane sugar Cane or beet sugar, in solid form, nes -- Other
Cane or beet sugar, in solid form, nes -- Other Artificial honey, caramel and other sugars (incl. invert sugar), nes -- Other
Cane molasses resulting from the extraction or refining of sugar Molasses resulting from the extraction or refining of sugar (excl. cane)
  
Figure 7 
























































Husked (brown) rice -- Medium grain Husked (brown) rice -- Of the varieties "Kernel Basmati" and "Super Basmati"
Husked (brown) rice -- Other Husked (brown) rice -- Other
Husked (brown) rice -- Medium grain Husked (brown) rice -- Of a length/width ratio greater than 2 but less than 3
Semi-milled or wholly milled rice -- Of a length/width ratio equal to or greater than 3 Semi-milled or wholly milled rice -- Round grain
Semi-milled or wholly milled rice -- Of a length/width ratio equal to or greater than 3
  
Figure 8 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Trade creation Trade diversion
  
Figure 11 










































































































































































Product codes  
Figure 12 
Scenario 2 – trade diversion: most affected countries and products – Total trade effects bigger than US$500,000 (in US$’000s) 








































Product codes  
Figure 13 





































































































































































































Paddy rice Brown rice Milled rice Broken rice
  
Figure 14 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Raw cane sugar - for refining Raw cane sugar - other
Beet sugar - for refining Beet sugar - other
Raw sugar - containing added flavouring or colouring matter  Cane sugar
White sugar - other Other sugars
Cane molasses
 